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 Disability Human Rights 
Michael Ashley Stein† 
 Responding to the absence of an international treaty expressly 
protecting people with disabilities, the United Nations General Assembly 
will soon adopt a disability-based human rights convention. This Article 
examines the theoretical implications of adding disability to the existing 
canon of human rights, both for individuals with disabilities and for other 
under-protected people. It develops a “disability human rights paradigm” 
by combining components of the social model of disability, the human right 
to development, and Martha Nussbaum’s version of the capabilities 
approach, but filters them through a disability rights perspective to 
preserve that which provides for individual flourishing and modifying that 
which does not. This Article maintains that Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach provides an especially fertile space within which to understand 
the content of human rights. However, because her scheme excludes some 
intellectually disabled individuals and conditions the inclusion of others, it 
falls short of a comprehensive framework. Amending Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach to develop the talents of all individuals results in a 
disability human rights paradigm that recognizes the dignity and worth of 
every person. This Article also argues that a disability rights paradigm is 
capable of fortifying human rights in two ways: first, it can reinforce 
protections afforded to groups already protected, such as women; and 
second, it can extend protections to people currently not protected, such as 
sexual minorities and the poor. Ultimately, the disability rights paradigm 
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indicates that human rights protection can progress from a group to an 
individual basis. Repositioning disability as an inclusive concept embraces 
disability as a universal human variation rather than an aberration.  
Introduction  
 More than six hundred million people, or about 10% of the world’s 
population, have some type of disability.1 Around 80% of disabled persons 
live in developing countries, where they experience material deprivation 
and social exclusion.2 For example, only 2% of disabled children in such 
countries receive any schooling.3 Nevertheless, no existing United Nations 
human rights treaty expressly protects people with disabilities. To claim 
protection under a United Nations convention, disabled individuals must 
either invoke a universal provision or embody a separately protected 
characteristic. For instance, a woman with a disability may not claim 
protection based on her disability status alone, but may claim protection 
from torture or from sex discrimination.  
 As a result of these limitations, only a handful of disability-based 
human rights claims have been asserted under these “hard laws.” By 
contrast, a series of General Assembly resolutions, declarations, and 
protocols explicitly reference disability. Yet these “soft laws” are not 
legally enforceable. Consequently, no existing international human rights 
instrument is both applicable to and enforceable by individuals on the basis 
of disability. In response to this void, the United Nations commissioned an 
Ad Hoc Committee to consider an international convention specifically 
protecting the human rights of disabled persons. As of this writing, that 
committee has drafted articles for consideration by the General Assembly.  
  This Article examines the theoretical implications of adding disability 
protections to the existing canon of human rights, both for individuals with 
disabilities and for other under-protected people.4 To do so, it develops a 
“disability human rights paradigm” that combines components of the social 
model of disability, the human right to development, and philosopher 
                                                                                                                          
 1. Gerard Quinn et al., Human Rights and Disability 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.nhri.net/pdf/disability.pdf. 
 2. See The Second Annual Report on the Implementation of USAID Disability Policy 
1-2 (2000), http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/PDABT610.pdf. For a sense of how the varying levels of 
disability are reported from country to country, see Statistics Div., U.N. Dep’t of Econs. &  
Soc. Affairs, Human Functioning and Disability, available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/ 
demographic/sconcerns/disability/default.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2006).  
 3. See Quinn et al., supra note 1, at 1.  
 4. Although the proposed convention is an expedient framework for discussing the 
repercussions of incorporating disability-based rights into the extant body of human rights treaties, my 
arguments do not depend on its passage. At the same time, I freely admit that I favor enactment of the 
proposed convention, and, moreover, that I am privileged to have been involved in its development.  
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Martha Nussbaum’s version of the “capabilities approach,” 5  but filters 
these frameworks through a disability rights perspective to preserve that 
which provides for individual flourishing and modify that which does not.  
 Nussbaum’s capabilities approach generally values the dignity, 
autonomy, and potential of all individuals, and views each as his or her 
own end. In doing so, her framework provides an elegant normative theory 
of human rights as a means of ensuring human flourishing. However, 
Nussbaum’s scheme does not sufficiently account for the development of 
individual talent. This is because it requires that individuals be capable of 
attaining each of ten functional abilities as a prerequisite to being “truly 
human” and thus wholly entitled to resource distribution. Consequently, her 
framework excludes some individuals with intellectual disabilities, and only 
indirectly assists others.6  
 A more inclusive approach is the disability human rights paradigm, 
which maintains as a moral imperative that every person is entitled to the 
means necessary to develop and express his or her own individual talent. 
This paradigm compels societies to acknowledge the value of all persons 
based on inherent human worth, rather than basing value on an individual’s 
measured functional ability to contribute to society. Accordingly the 
framework assesses ability from the bottom up, embracing all 
individuals—including those excluded by Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach—and accounting for their functional variations. By putting 
potential talent above function, the paradigm I offer embraces disability as 
a universal variation rather than as an aberration. This approach is 
necessary if human rights are to apply to all humans.  
 This Article also argues that disability-based human rights necessarily 
invoke both civil and political (“first-generation”) rights, as well as 
economic, social, and cultural (“second-generation”) rights to a greater 
degree than previous human rights paradigms. Broadly stated, first-
generation rights largely occupy the focus of human rights practitioners 
and advocates. These rights are understood as promoting equal treatment 
among individuals, and include prohibitions against State interference. 
                                                                                                                          
 5. Strictly speaking, the capabilities approach originates with Amartya Sen’s development 
economics theories. See, e.g., Amartya K. Sen, Development as Capability Expansion, in 
Human Development and the International Development Strategy for the 1990s 1 (Keith 
Griffin & John Knight eds., 1990) [hereinafter Sen, Development as Capability Expansion]. The 
premises proffered, by Nussbaum and Sen, respectively, provide essential support for arguments made 
in this Article. In Parts III.B-C., I build on—and strongly critique—Nussbaum’s version to help model 
a framework for human rights because I find her feminist perspective conducive to disability rights 
discourse. I utilize Sen’s economic methodology primarily in Part IV.B. to argue in favor of extending 
human rights protection to the poor because of its deeper link to development economics.  
 6. By logical extension Nussbaum’s capabilities approach also excludes some individuals with 
non-intellectual disabilities as well as certain lower functioning individuals without disabilities. A full 
discussion exceeds the boundaries of this Article.  
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Sometimes these rights are thought of as “negative rights.”7 Examples of 
first-generation rights are the rights to life, movement, thought, expression, 
association, religion, and political participation.8 Second-generation rights 
are traditionally the province of development agencies. These rights are 
understood as providing equal opportunity, and are often thought of as 
“positive rights.”9 Second-generation rights generally focus on standards of 
living, including issues such as the availability of housing and education.10  
 Tying first- and second-generation rights together illustrates how the 
disability human rights paradigm can be applied to other people. The social 
attitudes underlying disability-related exclusion manifest more overtly than 
those causing isolation of other groups. Applying a disability paradigm 
highlights the effect of social exclusion, and points out the need of 
ensuring that the human rights of all socially marginalized groups are 
protected. As a result, the disability human rights paradigm reaffirms that 
established human rights protections, like those extending to women, 
require indivisible application of first- and second-generation rights as 
envisioned by the third-generation human right to development. The 
disability framework also maintains that human rights protections should 
be applied to other marginalized people, such as sexual minorities and the 
poor. Ultimately, the disability rights paradigm indicates that human rights 
protection can progress from a group to an individual basis. Thus, in 
addition to advocating for disability-specific protection paralleling that of 
established human rights instruments—itself a rare exercise in legal 
literature11—I proffer an argument for extending disability-based human 
                                                                                                                          
 7. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty 118, 122 (1958) 
(declaiming that authentic liberty is simply the absence of “the deliberate interference of other human 
beings within the area in which I could otherwise act”).  
 8. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 6, 
para. 1, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (“Every human being has the 
inherent right to life.”) [hereinafter ICCPR]; ICCPR, supra, art. 9, para. 1 (“Everyone has the right to 
liberty and security of person.”); ICCPR, supra, art. 12, para. 1 (“Everyone lawfully within the territory 
of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his 
residence.”); ICCPR, supra, art. 18, para. 1 (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.”). 
 9. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), art. 11, para. 1, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 16, 1966) 
(“States parties . . . recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living”) [hereinafter 
ICESCR]; Berlin, supra note 7, at 123 (defining positive liberty as the result of self-reliance and the 
ability to direct one’s own agency).  
 10. It is significant that development agencies have only more recently embraced first-generation 
rights. Human rights scholars have long criticized these entities for neglecting human rights to focus 
exclusively on subsistence issues, meaning food and clean water. See, e.g., Philip Alston, The Fortieth 
Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in Human Rights in a Pluralist World 
1, 11-12 (J. Berting et al. eds., 1990). 
 11. A notable exception is The Human Rights of Persons with Intellectual 
Disabilities: Different but Equal (Stanley S. Herr et al. eds., 2003) (publishing the proceedings of 
a 1995 conference convened at Yale Law School) [hereinafter Different but Equal].  
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rights concepts to other socially excluded individuals. 12  The paradigm 
therefore stakes out a distinct perspective on human rights law, one I hope 
will encourage further discussion.  
 Parts I and II set forth the existing canon of disability-based human 
rights protections. Part I considers current United Nations instruments 
pertaining to disability, and briefly recounts the efforts underway to pass a 
convention on behalf of disabled persons. Part II describes the social model 
of disability in contrast to the medical model, and discusses its growing 
influence on the formation of international instruments as well as its 
limitations in overall human rights discourse. Parts III and IV consider the 
implications of applying a disability human rights paradigm both to 
persons with disabilities and other groups. Part III develops the paradigm 
by integrating Martha Nussbaum’s version of the capabilities approach 
with the social model of disability and the human right to development. 
Part IV argues that the clearly indivisible nature of disability-based rights 
presents a strong exemplar, indicating the ability to understand established 
human rights as similarly undividable, and creates the possibility for 
extending human rights protection to other vulnerable populations. This 
Article concludes with a few thoughts on the potential consequences of 
viewing disability as universal to rather than abnormal from the human 
condition. 
I 
The Scope of Disability Human Rights 
 Each of the seven core United Nations treaties theoretically applies to 
disabled persons in varying degrees, but are rarely applied in practice. 
Compounding this problem, General Assembly soft laws explicitly 
referencing disability are legally unenforceable. An international 
convention specifically protecting the human rights of disabled persons 
will soon be considered by the General Assembly.  
A. Hard Laws: United Nations Core Treaties 
 Since its formation after the Second World War, the United Nations 
has promulgated seven core legally enforceable human rights treaties.13 
                                                                                                                          
 12. The only comparable analysis I am aware of is Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, 
Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 Duke L.J. 1 (1996), which sought to 
extend Americans with Disabilities Act reasonable workplace accommodations to members of 
constitutionally protected classes.  
 13. Whether treaties are actually enforced, as well as the broader question of whether 
international law is “law,” has long been the subject of academic debate, the resolution of which goes 
far beyond this Article. For now it bears noting that perhaps the most significant objection to the notion 
of enforceability is the observation that under international law States parties retain the ability to opt 
out of treaties, in whole or in part, as well as to reserve independent understandings of their application. 
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Each of these hard laws implicitly protects persons with disabilities, but to 
varying degrees. To invoke these protections, disabled persons must either 
fall under a universal provision or possess a separately protected 
characteristic in addition to his or her disability. To date, no United 
Nations human rights treaty expressly applies to individuals on the basis of 
a disability-related characteristic.14  
 Two components of the International Bill of Human Rights, 15  the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)16 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR),17 are universal in scope.18 The same is true for the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT).19 Although disability is not specifically mentioned in 
                                                                                                                          
For two very different perspectives on the implications of this State prerogative, compare Oona A. 
Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1821 (2003) (maintaining that traditional 
understandings of treaty ratification do not adequately account for the likelihood of national 
compliance) and Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 Yale L.J. 
1935 (2002) (asserting that some number of States ratify human rights treaties as a means of avoiding 
observance), with Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, 54 Duke L.J. 621 (2004) (arguing that international human rights 
treaties encourage domestic legal norm changes) [hereinafter Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence 
States], and Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 13 Euro. 
J. Int’l. L.171 (2003) (same, while also critiquing the empirical evidence upon which Hathaway based 
her conclusions). For a harmonizing approach, see Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, A Theory 
of Expressive International Law, 60 Vand. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007).  
 14. Similarly, disabled persons are not explicitly included in non-treaty United Nations 
instruments. For example, both the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights promote human rights, but neither expressly references disability. See, e.g., U.N. 
Charter art. 55, para C. (expressing an aspiration to promote “universal respect for, and observance 
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion”); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), arts. 1-2, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (proclaiming that “all human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights” and are “entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status.”) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].  
 15. See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1): International 
Bill of Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs2.htm (the International Bill of Human 
Rights is a collection of international instruments, including the Universal Declaration, ICCPR, ICESR, 
and two Optional Protocols).  
 16. ICCPR, supra note 8.  
 17. ICESCR, supra note 9. 
 18. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 8, at pmbl. (averring that “recognition of the inherent dignity 
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world”); ICESCR supra note 9, at art. 2, para. 2 (the rights 
enumerated in the ICESCR “will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, 
colour . . . or other status”). 
 19. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, at 197, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. 
A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CAT]. 
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any of these treaties, they technically include all human beings within their 
respective provinces.20  
 In addition to these three universal treaties, the General Assembly has 
enacted four hard law treaties protecting people based on specific identity 
characteristics unrelated to disability. 21  In chronological order, these 
are: the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD);22 the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW);23 the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC);24 and the International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families (ICPMW). 25  The CRC alone among these treaties contains a 
specific disability-related article; it requires that States parties recognize 
the rights of children with disabilities to enjoy “full and decent” lives and 
participate in their communities. 26  However, the relative financial 
constraints of States parties tempers the obligation. Moreover, the CRC 
                                                                                                                          
 20. See generally Gerard Quinn, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
Disability: A Conceptual Framework, in Human Rights and Disabled Persons 69 (Theresia 
Degener & Yolan Koster-Dreese eds., 1995) [hereinafter Human Rights and Disabled Persons]; 
Philip Alston, Disability and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in 
Human Rights and Disabled Persons, supra, at 94; Manfred Nowak & Walter Suntinger, The Right 
of Disabled People Not to be Subjected to Torture, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
in Human Rights and Disabled Persons, supra, at 117. 
 21. These provisions are a mixed blessing. On the positive side, they provide an additional 
avenue of protection for disabled persons experiencing “double discrimination” based on more than one 
identity characteristic. For example, a person may suffer prejudice as a result of being disabled and of 
Inuit heritage. On the negative side, they only protect individuals who encounter discrimination 
serially. Because disability is almost uniformly relegated to “other” status, disabled people’s rights are 
frequently overlooked. One example of such disregard is the Declaration that proceeded from the 2001 
World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance that 
was convened in Durban, South Africa. See World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia & Related Intolerance, Aug. 31-Sept. 8, 2001, Durban Declaration and Programme of 
Action, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.189/12, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/Durban.pdf. Although 
the Declaration encourages the General Assembly to enact disability specific human rights protection, 
it does not include disability among the otherwise inclusive catalog of identity statuses it deemed to 
suffer discrimination. See id. at para. 180. More trenchantly, individuals whose rights are violated 
“solely” due to their disability identity receive no added protection. 
 22. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. 
Res. 2106 (XX), at 47, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 12, 1965) [hereinafter 
ICERD]; see generally Theodor Meron, The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 79 Am. J. Int’l L. 283 (1985). 
 23. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 
34/180, at 193, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 17, 1979) [hereinafter 
CEDAW]. 
 24. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, at 166, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter CRC]. 
 25. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, at 261, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. 
Doc. A/45/49 (Dec. 18, 1990) [hereinafter ICPMW]. 
 26. CRC, supra note 24, at art. 23, para. 1.  
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does not mandate children with disabilities be treated or considered equal 
to children without disabilities. 27  Hence, except for the CRC’s limited 
concern for disabled children, persons with disabilities are not yet a group 
with specific protection.  
 In a 1993 report, a Special Rapporteur cautioned that in the absence of 
specific treaty protection, human rights abuses against the disabled would 
likely continue without redress.28 Unfortunately, this prediction has largely 
been borne out. In the decade following the report, seventeen disability-
related complaints have been asserted under core United Nations 
instruments. Of these claims, thirteen were declared inadmissible by their 
respective monitoring committees. 29  The larger implication is that at 
present six hundred million persons with disabilities worldwide have 
implied but not actual human rights protection.  
B. Soft Laws: United Nations Declarations and Resolutions 
 In contrast to hard law treaties that do not enumerate specific 
disability protections, a number of soft laws expressly provide for disabled 
individuals. 30  These include General Assembly designations of the 
International Year of the Disabled in 1981,31 and the International Decade 
                                                                                                                          
 27. See CRC, supra note 24, at art. 23, paras. 1-3 (“[T]he disabled child has effective access to 
and receives education, training . . . preparataion for employment and recreational opportunities in a 
manner conducive to the child’s receiving the fullest possible social integration and individual 
development.”). The equality of disabled children has, however, been emphasized by the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on 
Human Rights, Rights of the Child, para. 22, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/75 (Apr. 25, 2001); U.N. 
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Rights of the Child, para. 29, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/2000/85 (Apr. 27, 2000); see generally Thomas Hammarberg, The Rights of Disabled 
Children—The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, in Human Rights and Disabled Persons, 
supra note 20, at 147. 
 28. See Leandro Despouy, Report on Human Rights and Disabled Persons paras. 280-81 
(1993), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/dispaperdes0.htm (noting that “persons with 
disabilities are going to find themselves in a legal disadvantage in relation to other vulnerable groups” 
because “unlike the other vulnerable groups, they do not have an international control body to provide 
them with particular and specific protection”).  
 29. The ICESCR, the CRC, and the ICPRAMW do not allow the assertion of individual 
complaints. Individual complaints can be brought under the ICCPR, the CAT, the CEDAW, or the 
ICERD. The website maintained by the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights contains 
detailed information on the operation of the United Nations human rights treaty bodies. See Office of 
the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch (last visited Sept. 26, 2006). The 
decisions of the three relevant monitoring committees can be accessed through the Netherlands Institute 
of Human Rights web page. See Neth. Inst. of Human Rights, Welcome to the Sim Documentation Site, 
http://sim.law.uu.nl/sim/Dochome.nsf (under case law) (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).  
 30. An overview of the basic documentation is maintained by a special unit of the Division for 
Social Policy and Development from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 
See United Nations Enable Webpage, www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable. 
 31. International Year of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 36/77, at 176, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., 
Supp. No. 77, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/77 (Dec. 8, 1981). 
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of Disabled Persons from 1982-1991.32 The United Nations has also passed 
resolutions such as the Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded 
Persons, 33  and the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons. 34 
Additionally, the General Assembly adopted a World Programme of 
Action Concerning Disabled Persons (WPA) to encourage the development 
of national programs directed at achieving equality for people with 
disabilities.35  
 Most significant among the soft laws are the Standard Rules on the 
Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (Standard 
Rules),36 which are monitored by a Special Rapporteur.37 The drawback to 
these soft laws is that, as resolutions, they lack legally binding power.38  
C. The Proposed United Nations Convention  
 Acting on previous proposals to address the lack of specific human 
rights protection for disabled persons,39 in December 2001 the General 
Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee to consider enacting a 
disability-based human rights instrument.40 The Ad Hoc Committee in turn 
                                                                                                                          
 32. Implementation of the World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 
37/53, at 186-87, para. 11, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/53 (Dec. 3, 
1982). 
 33. Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, G.A. Res. 2856 (XXVI), at 93, U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. No. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (Dec. 20, 1971). 
 34. Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 3447 (XXX), at 88, U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 9, 1975). 
 35. World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 37/52, at 185, U.N. 
GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/52 (Dec. 3, 1982) [hereinafter World 
Programme]. 
 36. Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons With Disabilities, G.A. Res. 
48/96, at 202, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/96 (Dec. 20, 1993) 
[hereinafter Standard Rules]. 
 37. The first Special Rapporteur for Disability, Bengt Lindquivist of Sweden, was appointed in 
1994, and had his commission renewed in 1997 and in 2000. See United Nations Enable, The Special 
Rapporteur on Disability of the Commission for Social Development, http://www.un.org/ 
esa/socdev/enable/rapporteur.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2006). The current Special Rapporteur for 
Disability is Sheikha Hissa Al Thani of Qatar. Id. For an insider’s perspective on the role of the Special 
Rapporteur, see Bengt Lindqvist, Standard Rules in the Disability Field—A New United Nations 
Instrument, in Human Rights and Disabled Persons, supra note 20, at 63.  
 38. See, e.g., The Protection of Human Rights in the Context of Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
(HIV) and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), U.N.C.H.R. Res. 1997/33, U.N. ESCOR, 
53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/150 (Apr. 11, 1997); The Protection of Persons with Mental 
Illnesses and the Improvement of Mental Health Care, G.A. Res. 46/119, at 188, U.N. GAOR, 46th 
Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (Dec. 17, 1991).  
 39. Notably, in 1987, Italy proffered a convention draft during the forty-second session of the 
General Assembly. See U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., 16th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/42/SR.16 (Oct. 19, 1987). 
Sweden did the same two years later at the General Assembly’s forty-fourth session. See U.N. GAOR, 
44th Sess., 16th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/44/SR.16 (Oct. 24, 1989).  
 40. Comprehensive and Integral International Convention to Promote and Protect the Rights and 
Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 56/168, U.N GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 168, U.N. 
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authorized a working group to draw up a human rights treaty proposal.41 
On January 16, 2004, the working group issued “Draft Articles”; on 
August 25, 2006, the last day of its eighth session negotiating and 
amending the proposed treaty, the Ad Hoc Committee adopted the revised 
Draft Articles.42 The General Assembly is likely to adopt the convention 
during the sixty-first session. The Draft Articles reaffirm the seven core 
treaties43 and operationalize their content. In pertinent part, the Articles 
state their purpose as “to promote, protect, and ensure the full and equal 
enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons 
with disabilities,” 44  and enunciate essential principles guaranteeing 
disabled individuals “individual autonomy and independence,” “full 
participation,” and “inherent dignity and worth.”45 Thus the Draft Articles 
include both first- and second-generation rights, 46  and expressly call 
attention to their indivisibility.47  By way of enforcement, the proposed 
instrument mandates collecting statistics and submitting reports to 
                                                                                                                          
Doc. A/RES/56/168 (Dec. 19, 2001). A detailed description of the political process behind the United 
Nations decision to go forward with a disability human rights convention is set forth in the (United 
States) National Council on Disability (NCD), Newsroom, UN Disability Convention—Topics at a 
Glance: History of the Process, http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/history_process.htm 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2006).  
 41. Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Prot. & 
Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of Pers. with Disabilities, Report of the Working Group to the Ad 
Hoc Committee, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC.265/2004/WG.1 (Jan. 27, 2004). The working group 
included twelve nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”). See id. at para. 2. The inclusion of NGOs at 
this stage was unprecedented in the normal course of treaty development at the United Nations, and can 
be interpreted as acquiescence to NGOs’ assertion of “nothing about us without us.” Nonetheless, a 
countersignal was also sent to the disability community by locating the working group in New York—
the location of United Nations expertise on soft laws—rather than in Geneva, where core human rights 
treaties are deliberated. 
 42. See Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Prot. 
& Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of Pers. with Disabilities, Draft Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities and Draft Optional Protocol (2006), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc8adart.htm [hereinafter Draft Articles]. 
 43. Id. at pmbl., para. d.  
 44. Id. at Article 1. The Draft Articles state this goal is to be brought about through the use of 
“international cooperation.” Id. at para. j; see also CRC, supra note 24, at annex, pmbl. (“[r]ecognizing 
the importance of international co-operation”); CEDAW, supra note 23, at 194 (“[a]ffirming that the 
strengthening of . . . mutual cooperation among all States” is necessary for effectuation). 
 45. Draft Articles, supra note 42, at pmbl. (l), (k), (a).  
 46. Among the first- and second-generation rights enumerated are: rights to life, equality, 
expression, privacy, education, employment, health, habilitation and rehabilitation, social benefits, 
political and social participation, access to public venues, mobility independence, recreation, as well as 
freedom from discrimination, torture and abuse. Id. at arts. 10, 12, 21, 22, 24, 27, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 9, 
18, 30, 15-16. For a discussion of how these rights intersect and are harmonious with the capabilities 
approach, see infra Part III.B.  
 47. Draft Articles, supra note 42, at pmbl., para. c (“Reaffirming the universality, indivisibility 
and interdependence of all human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . .”) (emphasis omitted).  
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domestic monitoring bodies, 48  developing national policies for disabled 
citizens, 49  generally promoting positive attitudes toward persons with 
disabilities,50 and establishing a treaty body similar to those of the existing 
seven core conventions.51  
 Unfortunately, the Draft Articles leave several central terms, 
including “disability” and “accessibility,” conspicuously undefined 52 
because of political motivations.53 Yet the Draft Articles do expansively 
define “discrimination” as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction” that 
affects “the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with 
others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 54  The Draft 
Articles, and the definitions included therein, indicate a significant shift in 
how the international community views human rights, suggesting a 
willingness to rethink the sparse human rights protections specifically 
provided to persons with disabilities. 
II 
The Social Model of Disability 
 The social model of disability asserts that contingent social conditions 
rather than inherent biological limitations constrain individuals’ abilities 
and create a disability category. Beginning in the 1970s, international soft 
laws addressing disability have increasingly adopted precepts from the 
social model. Nevertheless, because advocates have limited the social 
model to formal equality theory, its application is limited within the human 
rights arena.  
                                                                                                                          
 48. See id. at art. 31 (“States parties undertake to collect appropriate information, including 
statistical and research data.”); id. at art. 33 (States parties are responsible for establishing systems for 
monitoring implementation).  
 49. See id. at art. 4, para. B; art. 33.  
 50. See id. at art. 8. These measures include instigating “public awareness campaigns,” 
mainstreaming public education, and “encouraging” positive images of the disabled in the mass media. 
Id. at art. 8, para. 2 (a)-(c).  
 51. Draft Articles, supra note 42, at art. 34. 
 52. See id. at art. 2 (definitions).  
 53. Specifically, to secure broad support in the General Assembly, several of the Working Group 
members believed these definitions should be purposely left vague so that States parties could interpret 
them according to their own legal and social cultures. Put another way, there was strong feeling among 
the participating government bodies that human rights enforcement is chiefly a local issue. As related 
in the NCD newsroom, the United States took an even more removed position, asserting that the matter 
of disability-related rights, in any form, was a “largely domestic mission” that individual states ought to 
pursue on their own initiatives. See Nat’l Council on Disability (NCD) Newsroom, supra note 40 
(quoting Ralph Boyd, former U.S. Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights). For that reason, the 
United States rarely participated in the convention process and does not intend to ratify any resultant 
instrument. See id. (U.S. would “‘participate in order to share our experiences . . . [but] not with the 
expectatoin that we [the U.S.] will become party to any resulting legal instrument.”).  
 54. See Draft Articles, supra note 42, at art. 2.  
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A. The Social Model versus the Medical Model 
 The common misperception of disability conforms to the “medical” 
model, which views a disabled person’s limitations as inherent, naturally 
and properly excluding her from participating in mainstream culture. 
Under this framework, people with disabilities are believed incapable of 
performing social functions because of medical conditions that impair 
various major life activities. As a consequence of this notion, disabled 
persons are either systemically excluded from social opportunity—such as 
receiving social welfare benefits in lieu of employment—or are accorded 
limited social participation—such as the case of educating disabled 
children in separate schools.55 
 In contrast to the medical model, disability studies scholars have long 
argued for an understanding of disability through a “social” model.56 This 
framework maintains that the socially engineered environment and the 
attitudes reflected in its construction play a central role in creating 
“disability.” According to the social model, collectively mandated 
decisions determine what conditions comprise the bodily norm in any 
given society.57 Thus, factors external to a disabled person’s limitations are 
really what determine that individual’s ability to function.58 Just as some 
cultures view female leaders as less capable than male leaders, 59  most 
                                                                                                                          
 55. See generally Kenny Fries, Introduction, in Staring Back: The Disability Experience 
From the Inside Out 6-7 (Kenny Fries ed., 1997) (noting that “[the medical] view of 
disability . . . puts the blame squarely on the individual”); Claire H. Liachowitz, Disability as a 
Social Construct (1988) ([T]he “medical/pathological paradigm” of disability stigmatizes the 
disabled by conditioning their inclusion only “on the terms of the able bodied majority.”). 
 56. Disability studies is an academic discipline analogous to that of critical race or feminist 
theory, with dedicated university departments. See Gary L. Albrecht et al., Introduction: The 
Formation of Disability Studies, in Handbook of Disability Studies 1, 1-8 (Gary L. Albrect et al. 
eds., 2001).  
 57. See generally Richard K. Scotch & Kay Schriner, Disability as Human 
Variation: Implications for Policy, 549 Annals AAPSS 148 (1997). 
 58. See Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality and Law: New Issues and 
Agendas, 4. S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 97 (1995); Ron Amundson, Disability, Handicap, and 
the Environment, 23 J. Soc. Phil. 105 (1992). The framework derives from both British and American 
disability rights scholars, although the latter have written more extensively on the legal implications of 
the model. Some scholars credit Michael Oliver with orginating the social model theory. See Michael 
Oliver, Social Work with Disabled People 23 (1983) (the social model is “nothing more 
fundamental than a switch away from focusing on the physical limitations of particular individuals to 
the way the physical and social environments impose limitations on certain groups or categories of 
people”). Political scientist Jacobus tenBroek made an early contribution to the development of the 
social model of disability in his classic article. See Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the 
World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 841, 842 (1966) (demonstrating how 
people with disabilities were historically held to higher duties of care in respect to the law of torts 
because they were perceived as inherently less able to engage in social functions). 
 59. See, e.g., The Ethnography of Malinowski: The Trobriand Islands 1915-18 111, 128-
31 (Michael W. Young ed., 1979) (the Trobriand society is a matrilineal society, believing that fathers 
have “nothing to do with the formation of [their child’s] body,” and that all lineage passes through the 
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societies have historically assumed disabled persons are less capable than 
nondisabled persons.60 The social model underscores the manner in which 
disability is culturally constructed.61  
B. The Social Model and United Nations Instruments 
 International resolutions relating to disabled persons were initially 
steeped in the medical model.62 Particularly influential among post-World 
War II international instruments was the “whole man” schema of 
                                                                                                                          
mother’s side of the family); Robert Briffault, The Mothers: The Matriarchal Theory of 
Social Origins 194-95 (1931) (classifying various American Indian tribes, such as the Navajo and 
Cheyenne, as matriarchal). 
 60. See, e.g., Jerome E. Bickenbach, Disability Human Rights, Law, and Policy, in Handbook 
of Disability Studies supra note 56, at 565, 567 (noting the commonly held assumption that 
“[d]isability is an abnormality, a lack, and a limitation of capacity”). The results of a recent study of 
prevailing attitudes towards individuals with intellectual disabilities across ten very different countries 
reflect this misperception. See Multinational Study of Attitudes Toward individuals with 
Intellectual Disabilities: General Finding and Calls to Action (2003), available at 
http://www.soill.org/pdfs/multinational_study.pdf. However, a minority of cultures believe people with 
disabilities are especially capable of various functions. In certain Asian countries—for example 
China—visually-impaired people are frequently trained and valued as masseuses. Moreover, it is illegal 
for those with ordinary vision to be employed as a masseuse in Taiwan. See DPP City Councilors Say 
Lein Received Sighted Massage, Taipei Times, Sept. 27, 2003, at 3, available at 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2003/09/27/2003069422. Indeed, there are social 
anthropologists who claim that the notion of “disability,” at least as a negative concept, is Western in 
origin and remains unknown to certain cultures, including some African societies. See, e.g., Aud Talle, 
A Child is a Child: Disability and Equality among the Kenya Maasai, in Disability and Culture 56 
(Benedicte Ingstad & Susan Reynolds Whyte eds., 1995); Benedicte Ingstad, Mpho ya Modimo—A Gift 
from God: Perspectives on “Attitudes” Toward Disabled Persons, in Disability and Culture, 
supra, at 246.  
 61. Philosopher Anita Silvers provides an eloquent application of the social model of disability to 
the accommodations required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and her underlying 
theory applies equally well to the statute’s international progeny. Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in 
Disability, Difference, Discrimination: Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and Public 
Policy 13 (Anita Silvers et al. eds., 1998). She argues that being physiologically anomalous is viewed 
as abnormal only because a dominant group imposed conditions favorable to its own circumstances, 
and not because of “any biological mandate or evolutionary triumph.” Id. at 73. Accordingly, the social 
model of disability recognizes the source of disabled people’s relative disadvantage as a hostile 
environment that is “artificial and remediable” instead of “natural and immutable.” Id. at 74-75. “If the 
majority of people, instead of just a few, wheeled rather than walked, graceful spiral ramps instead of 
jarringly angular staircases would connect lower to upper floors of buildings.” Id. at 74. Thus, a 
wheelchair-user experiences disability through antagonistic surroundings, including lack of access to 
workplaces, educational programs, medical services, and other areas open to the public. Because the 
ADA accommodations seek to eliminate subordination of individuals with disabilities, Silvers argues 
that the statute implicitly utilizes the social model of disability, and as such is a product of formal and 
equalizing justice. 
 62. The same may be said for both the United States and Europe. See, e.g., Richard K. Scotch, 
From Good Will to Civil Rights: Transforming Federal Disability Policy (2d ed. 2001) 
(assessing the motivations impelling United States policy); Lisa Waddington, Reassessing the 
Employment of People with Disabilities in Europe: From Quotas to Anti-Discrimination Laws, 18 
Comp. Lab. L.J. 62 (1996) (examining the theories informing European employment policies).  
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vocational rehabilitation.63 This method sought to “treat” disabled persons 
to facilitate their social participation. In this way, the method further 
instantiated the medical model’s notion that people with disabilities, rather 
than society, must change.64 For example, the General Assembly and the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council adopted a series of 
resolutions during the 1950s and 1960s directed both at preventing future 
disability and at rehabilitating existing disabilities.65 Indeed, the title of the 
Economic and Social Council’s 1950 resolution—Social Rehabilitation of 
the Physically Handicapped—indicates a policy targeting disabled people 
as the locus of treatment, rather than the external environment.  
 However, beginning in the 1970s international instruments evidenced 
a gradual shift from the medical model to the social model of disability.66 
Consequently, both the 1971 Declaration on the Rights of Mentally 
Retarded Persons and the 1975 Declaration on the Rights of Disabled 
Persons acknowledge the equality of disabled individuals. 67  Yet, these 
instruments possessed vestiges of the medical model by assuming 
individuals are disabled due to “special” medical problems that require 
segregated social services and institutions as remedies. 68  It was the 
following decade that saw a more thorough adoption of the social model of 
disability in United Nations instruments.69 
 Acting on the aphorism “[f]ull participation and equality,” the United 
Nations proclaimed 1981 the International Year of the Disabled, and the 
                                                                                                                          
 63. The term originates with political scientist Ruth O’Brien. See Ruth Ann O’Brien, Crippled 
Justice: The History of Modern Disability Policy in the Workplace (2001).  
 64. See Howard A. Rusk, Rehabilitation Medicine (1964); Henry Howard Kessler, 
Rehabilitation of the Physically Handicapped (2d ed. 1953). The timing of the medical model, 
as advanced by these two medical practitioners, was hardly coincidental. Scientific advances made 
during World War II resulted in higher survival rates for severely wounded soldiers. See, e.g., Surgery 
in World War II: Neurosurgery (John Boyd Coates, Jr. ed., 1959) (describing medical advances in 
neurosurgery, particularly in relation to treating spinal cord injuries). 
 65. See Maria Rita Saulle, Disabled Persons and International Organizations (1982) 
(providing a catalog of these resolutions); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Social 
Rehabilitation of the Physically Handicapped, Report of the Social Commission, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
No. E/AC.7./L.24 (July 13, 1950). 
 66. International soft laws are comparable to legislation passed in the United States and Europe 
over that same period requiring the provision of reasonable accommodation as an ameliorative to 
disabling environments. See generally Brian J. Doyle, Disability Discrimination: The New Law 
(1996); Christopher G. Bell, U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of 
Individual Abilities (1983).  
 67. For example, the Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons declares that 
persons with disabilities have the same civil and political rights as other human beings. Declaration on 
the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, supra note 33, at para. 4. 
 68. See, e.g., id. at pmbl. (emphasizing the need to protect disabled persons and their access to 
segregated services); Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, supra note 34, at para. 8 
(underscoring the needs of disabled persons to “special” services).  
 69. Quinn et al., supra note 1, at 30 (characterizing the change as “an irreversible shift”). 
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succeeding decade as the International Decade of Disabled Persons.70 More 
significantly, in 1982 the General Assembly also enacted the path-breaking 
WPA.71 Although this pronouncement reiterated the twin medical model 
goals of preventing and rehabilitating disability, it also advocated 
equalized opportunities for the disabled.72 The latter aspiration was defined 
as “the process through which the general system of society, such as the 
physical and cultural environment” is rendered accessible.73 Moreover, the 
WPA emphasized the insufficiency of rehabilitation to achieve this 
purpose. Instead, “[e]xperience shows that it is largely the environment 
which determines the effect of an impairment or a disability on a person’s 
daily life.”74  
 Continuing the trend toward full adoption of the social model, the 
1990s were “a banner period for disability law.”75 Passed in 1993, the 
Standard Rules remain the central United Nations document regarding 
disabled persons. The Standard Rules build on the WPA, both emphasizing 
the equality of people with disabilities and defining disability as a 
byproduct of social construction. For example, the instrument underscores 
the need to change general societal misperceptions about the disabled as 
well as provide sufficient services to support their full inclusion.76 Though 
the Standard Rules are monitored by a Special Rapporteur,77 the instrument 
is soft law and legally unenforceable. The Standard Rules nevertheless 
stress that States parties are under “a strong moral and political 
commitment” to ensure “the equalization of opportunities” for disabled 
persons.78  
                                                                                                                          
 70. World Programme, supra note 35, at 185. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Equalizing opportunities was defined as “the process through which the general system of 
society, such as the physical and cultural environment” is rendered accessible. World Programme of 
Action Concerning Disabled Persons 1 (1982), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/ 
enable/diswpa01.htm. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. at 2. 
 75. Theresia Degener, International Disability Law—A New Legal Subject on the Rise: The 
Interregional Experts’ Meeting in Hong Kong, December 13-17, 1999, 18 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 180, 
184 (2000). 
 76. See Standard Rules, supra note 36, at rules 1, 4. The social model of disability is reflected in 
the articulation of the Standard Rules’ aspirations: “the planning of societies and that all resources must 
be employed in such a way as to ensure that every individual has equal opportunity for participation.” 
Id. at introduction, para. 25. 
 77. Reports issued by the Special Rapporteur are available at U.N. Enable, The Special 
Rapporteur on Disability of the Commission for Social Development, http://www.un.org/esa/ 
socdev/enable/rapporteur.htm.  
 78. For a discussion of the unenforceability of the Standard Rules, see Dimitris Michailakis, The 
Standard Rules: A Weak Instrument and a Strong Commitment, in Disability, Divers-ability and 
Legal Change 117 (Melinda Jones & Lee Ann Basser Marks eds., 1999). The Standard Rules stress 
that States parties are under a strong moral and political commitment to ensure the equalization of 
opportunities for disabled persons. See Standard Rules, supra note 36, at introduction, para. 14. 
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 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (Vienna 
Declaration) was also enacted in 1993.79 It was not directed specifically 
toward disability rights, 80  but it nonetheless stressed the prevalence of 
disabled persons. Moreover, the Vienna Declaration assisted in 
accelerating the trend toward the social model of disability by maintaining 
that disabled persons “should be guaranteed equal opportunity through the 
elimination of all socially determined barriers,” including any “physical, 
financial, social or psychological” obstacles that “exclude or restrict full 
participation in society.”81  
 Finally, passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) during 
this period bears special notice.82 While domestic in scope, it has to date 
influenced more than forty countries to enact similar—and at times nearly 
verbatim—legislation. 83  The European Union’s Employment Framework 
Directive adopts key ADA definitions,84 and the Draft Articles follow suit.85 
Accordingly, international disability rights advocates point to the statute as a 
model worthy of emulation.86 
 The social model has also been well supported in the new millennium. 
The General Assembly World Summit on Social Development 
acknowledged the necessity of changing the socially constructed 
environment in accordance with the Standard Rules “to empower persons 
                                                                                                                          
Moreover, the Standard Rules obligate States parties “to create the legal bases . . . to achieve the 
objectives of full participation and equality for persons with disabilities,” to “ensure that organizations 
of persons with disabilities are involved in the development of national legislation concerning” their 
rights, and to eliminate “[a]ny discriminatory provisions against persons with disabilities.” Id. at rule 
15.  
 79. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 157/24 (July 12, 1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration]. 
 80. Id. at para. 5 (“All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated.”). 
 81. Id. at para. 64 (disabled persons “should be guaranteed equal opportunity through the 
elimination of all socially determined barriers,” including any “physical, financial, social or 
psychological” obstacles that “exclude or restrict full participation in society”).  
 82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 (2000).  
 83. See Theresia Degener & Gerard Quinn, A Survey of International, Comparative and Regional 
Disability Law Reform, in Disability Rights Law and Policy: International and National 
Perspectives 3 (Mary Lou Breslin & Silvia Yee eds., 2002).  
 84. For a discussion of the role and content of reasonable accommodation under the EU directive, 
see Lisa Waddington, The Framework Employment Directive from a Disability 
Perspective: Reasonable Accommodation and Positive Action, in Disability Rights’ Activist And 
Advocates Training Manual 19 (2005). 
 85. See, e.g., Draft Articles, supra note 42, at art. 27, para. i (requiring States parties to make 
reasonable accommodations).  
 86. See, e.g., Katharina C. Heyer, The ADA on the Road: Disability Rights in Germany, 27 Law 
& Soc. Inquiry 723 (2002); Eric A. Besner, Employment Legislation for Disabled Individuals: What 
Can France Learn from the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 16 Comp. Lab. L.J. 399 (1995). Despite 
this trend, there are some disability rights advocates, including myself, who caution against adopting 
ADA-type rights protection exclusively. See infra Part II.C. 
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with disabilities to play their full role in society.”87 But perhaps the most 
progressive enunciation in an international instrument is found in the Draft 
Articles, which recognize “the importance of accessibility to the physical, 
social and economic environment” as a means of “redressing the profound 
social disadvantage of persons with disabilities.”88 By this recognition, the 
Draft Articles transcend the social model and adopt a “human right to 
development” approach, integrating first- and second-generation rights. 
C. Limitations of the Social Model  
 The above historical overview attests to the social model’s powerful 
and constructive influence on international and domestic instruments. 
Nevertheless, because the framework’s advocates have invoked only 
formal equality theory, the model encounters two obstacles. First, because 
it expressly relies on notions of corrective justice, the social model must 
overcome erroneous but strongly held notions that the world inevitably 
excludes disabled persons. Second, and of greater significance, because it 
exclusively concentrates on first-generation rights, the social model is 
prevented from invoking a full range of second-generation rights. 
 In asserting that the socially constructed environment creates 
disabling conditions, the social model avers that altering that environment 
allows disabled persons to participate in society at large. Reasonable 
workplace accommodations are a typical example of correcting artificially 
prejudicial conditions previously held out as “neutral.” Providing 
accommodations in the workplace changes existing hierarchies, ultimately 
suggesting a lack of inevitability in the structure and conception of 
particular occupations. By removing unnecessary barriers to participation, 
accommodations bring about equality as conceived by formal justice.89 
However, because the social model is based exclusively on this notion of 
corrective justice, it must overcome the deeply entrenched fallacy that 
society justifiably excludes disabled persons due to their inherent 
limitations.90 In seeking to win this fight, social model advocates have taken 
an over-inclusive position of rejecting all, instead of many or most, 
disability-related exclusions as arising from arbitrarily selected biological 
                                                                                                                          
 87. G.A. Res. S-24/2, para. 66, U.N. Doc A/RES/S-24/2 (July 1, 2000). See also Theresia 
Degener, Disabled Persons and Human Rights: The Legal Framework, in Human Rights and 
Disabled Persons, supra note 20, at 9, 20-33.  
 88. Draft Articles, supra note 42, at pmbl., paras. t, v. 
 89. See Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as 
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 579 (2004) (arguing that ADA-mandated accommodations are 
consistent with other antidiscrimination measures in that each remedies exclusion from employment 
opportunity by questioning the inherency of established workplace norms, and by engendering cost when 
altering those norms) [hereinafter Stein, Same Struggle].  
 90. The view is so prevalent that one scholar has termed it “canonical.” Christine Jolls, 
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 642, 643-44 (2001).  
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norms. 91  This effort is unnecessary because correcting exclusionary 
conditions (and the attitudes supporting them) need not be contingent on 
the application of first-generation rights alone. Instead, social inclusion is 
better facilitated under a human rights paradigm that applies civil and 
political rights (that equalize treatment) in combination with economic, 
social, and cultural rights (that equalize opportunity).  
 This brings forward the second, and more important, problem: while 
the social model’s precepts are essential to civil rights assertions, they 
ultimately fall short within the human rights field. The social model draws 
an inclusive, yet firm line at equal treatment of equally situated 
individuals, 92  thereby effectively excluding additional second-generation 
support for disabled persons not contingent on narrower corrective justice 
notions.93 By contrast, second-generation rights recognize that all disabled 
persons are entitled to equal opportunities because of their equal humanity, 
not because they reach levels of functional sameness,94 and thereby allows 
for individual differences among people with disabilities. 
 In so doing, second-generation rights cover two circumstances. They 
encompass entitlements that benefit persons with disabilities who fall 
outside standard sameness arguments. This is because some individual 
variations are not accounted for, even when using broad and inclusive 
principles, for instance those contained in the architectural concept of 
Universal Design.95 Second-generation rights also include measures that 
                                                                                                                          
 91. A particularly strong version of this assertion is that of feminist and disability rights advocate 
Susan Wendell who avers that “the entire physical and social organization of life” has been created 
with the notion in mind that “everyone w[as] physically strong, as though all bodies were shaped the 
same, as though everyone could walk, hear, and see well, as though everyone could work and play at a 
pace that is not compatible with any kind of illness or pain.” Susan Wendell, The Rejected 
Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability 39 (1996). Wendell’s point, although 
valid, should not be overstated. Because I generally agree with the disability studies perspective, but 
disagree on the extent of its application, I have used the term “artificial” to mean avoidable (because it 
is either arbitrary and/or can be remedied through a manageable cost) when discussing ADA 
accommodations. See Stein, Same Struggle, supra note 89. 
 92. In other words, the social model is predicated on treating like cases alike. For what is perhaps 
the earliest exposition of this theory, see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 118-19 (Martin Ostwald 
trans., 1962) (professing that things that are alike should be treated alike).  
 93. Social, economic, and cultural rights are derived from the field of social justice which 
advocates treating all individuals equally, whether or not they are in fact equal. See, e.g., John Rawls, 
A Theory of Justice 302-03 (1971) (defining distributive justice generally as the theory that “[a]ll 
social primary goods—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—are 
to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage 
of the least favored”).  
 94. “Human rights are, literally, the rights that one has simply because one is a human being . . . . 
Human rights are equal rights: one either is or is not a human being, and therefore has the same human 
rights as everyone else (or none at all).” Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights In Theory and 
Practice 10 (2003). 
 95. The central tenet of Universal Design is an “approach to creating environments and products 
that are usable by all people to the greatest extent possible.” R. Mace et al., Accessible 
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are necessary to effectuate first-generation rights. Thus, while first-
generation rights may prohibit discrimination in employment, second-
generation rights make labor market participation possible by providing 
health care, education, and employment preferences and quotas. By 
limiting their advocacy to first-generation rights, social model proponents 
have neglected further empowering possibilities. 96  The adoption of a 
“disability human rights” model can solve these limitations.  
III 
The Disability Human Rights Paradigm  
 This Part outlines the disability human rights paradigm, which 
integrates the best features of the social model of disability, the human 
right to development, and Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to 
create a comprehensive view of rights. The social model stresses society’s 
role in constructing disability and its responsibility to rectify disability-
based exclusion. Yet, because advocates have justified this scheme 
exclusively though formal justice notions, the model has neglected 
economic, social and cultural rights. The human right to development, 
which underlies the Draft Articles, seamlessly combines first- and second-
generation rights, thus avoiding a major shortcoming of the social model of 
disability. At the same time, this framework is as vulnerable to monitoring, 
content, and resource prioritization concerns as are more traditional 
versions of human rights. Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach 
                                                                                                                          
Environments: Toward Universal Design, in Design Interventions: Towards a More Humane 
Architecture 155, 156 (Wolfgang Prieser et al. eds., 1991). Although the inclusive nature of 
Universal Design extends beyond disability, e.g., Selwyn Goldsmith, Access all Areas, 213 
Architects’ J. 42 (2001) (asserting that universal design encompasses not only people with 
disabilities but also parents with small children and women forced to wait for pubic toilets), it is 
nevertheless frequently described as a disability-specific issue. For rebuttals of this perspective, see 
Robert Imrie, Disability and the City: International Perspectives (1996). 
 96. Clarification is in order. Disability rights advocates applying the social model to this 
hypothetical instance would surely argue that both public transportation systems and health care 
systems that excluded disabled persons based on socially contingent factors (e.g., physically 
inaccessible buses and insurance policies that exclude coverage for people with AIDS) were artificial in 
nature (because there was no reason to have buses with steps as opposed to ramped ones, and that there 
was no intrinsic difference between treating pneumonia arising from the flu as opposed to HIV). What 
disability rights advocates have not traditionally done is link the two concepts so that equality in the 
artificially excluded workplace also mandates equality in the artificially excluded public transportation 
and health care areas. The reason for this disconnect is that the two arguments cannot be joined so long 
as the underlying basis of their assertions is formal justice, meaning that the extent of disabled versus 
non-disabled equality is assessed in terms of sameness under civil rights statutes that focus on the acts 
or omissions of one actor (whether an employer or a public service entity) rather than of society at 
large. This subtle weakness of disability rights advocacy has recently been taken up by Samuel 
Bagenstos. He points out that as far as the ADA is concerned, there is no statutory reason why the 
provision of a reasonable accommodation ought to stop at the workshop door. Samuel R. Bagenstos, 
The Future of Disability Law, 114 Yale L.J. 1, 26-32 (2004) (discussing the importance of proper 
health care to ensure greater employment opportunities).  
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creates a fertile space within which to understand the reach and content of 
the human right to development. However, because her scheme requires 
levels of minimal function as a condition precedent to acknowledging an 
individual’s equal humanity and social participation, it is fundamentally 
under-inclusive of some people with intellectual disabilities, conditions the 
inclusion of others through proxies, and inadequately accounts for the 
development of individual talent. By harnessing the assets of the human 
right to development and the capabilities approach, the disability human 
rights paradigm overcomes the foregoing limitations. It both acknowledges 
the role that social circumstances play in creating disabling conditions and 
insists on the development of all individual talent.  
A. The Human Right to Development  
 The human right to development is the most recent theory of human 
rights and underlies contemporary treaties, including the Draft Articles. 
This third-generation of human rights integrates civil and political rights 
with economic, social, and cultural rights.97 Consequently, the human right 
to development avoids a major conceptual and practical shortfall of the 
social model of disability. Nevertheless, this framework can neither avoid 
nor satisfy three concerns endemic to human rights treaties: the efficacy of 
monitoring devices, the sufficiency of content, and prioritization issues 
when State resources are limited.98  
 Though of comparatively recent origin, the right to development has 
gained purchase over the past several years. In 1986, the General 
Assembly’s Declaration on the Right to Development established 
development as a human right. 99  Subsequently, the 1993 Vienna 
Declaration proclaimed the right to development was “a universal and 
inalienable right” as well as “an integral part of fundamental human 
rights.” 100  In 1998, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
approved a resolution requiring the United Nations Economic and Social 
                                                                                                                          
 97. See generally Stephen P. Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?, 
33 Rutgers L. Rev. 435, 435-52 (1981). 
 98. For additional, more tangential concerns, see Stephen P. Marks, The Human Right to 
Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 137 (2004). 
 99. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, at 183, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 
41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986). A few General Assembly 
resolutions referenced the right to development prior to the DRD. See, e.g., U.N. ESCOR, 33d Sess., 
Supp. No. 6, at 74-75, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1257; U.N. ESCOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No 6, at 107, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/1347; U.N. ESCOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No 5, at 238, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1475. 
 100. Vienna Declaration, supra note 79, at para. 10; see also High Comissioner for the Promotion 
and Protection of All Human Rights, G.A. Res. 48/141, at 261, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/141 (Dec. 20, 1993) (General Assembly mandate that the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights organize “a new branch whose primary responsibilities would include the promotion and 
protection of the right to development”) [hereinafter High Commissioner].  
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Council to appoint both an Independent Expert and an open-ended working 
group on the right to development. 101  The Office of the High 
Commissioner on Human Rights maintains a research department to 
coordinate development tasks within the United Nations system.102 
 Though lacking legal enforceability, the human right to development 
nonetheless persuaded academics, 103  United Nations agencies, 104  and 
States 105  to accept the inextricable interrelationship among first- and 
second-generation human rights. Unfortunately, for reasons development 
scholar Peter Uvin decries as both outmoded and counter-productive, this 
generational rights divide manifested into a partition of labor and perceived 
expertise among international actors.106 Influenced by the human right to 
development, many experts now share Uvin’s belief that first- and second-
generation rights are neither conceptually, nor pragmatically immiscible.107 
Cass Sunstein finds exclusive focus on one of these types of rights 
                                                                                                                          
 101. E.S.C. Res. 72, at 229, U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/177 
(1998).  
 102. High Comissioner, supra note 100, at 262 (mandating the OHCHR “Research and Right to 
Development Branch” to “[r]ecognize the importance of promoting a balanced and sustainable 
development for all people” and to “to enhance support from relevant bodies of the United Nations 
system for this purpose.” For the Independent Expert’s perspective, see Arjun Sengupta, Development 
Co-operation and the Right to Development, in Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the 
Downtrodden: Essays in Honour of Asbjorn Eide 371 (Morten Bergsmo ed., 2003). 
 103. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to 
Development, 1 Harv. Hum. Rts. Y.B. 3 (1988) [hereinafter Alston, Making Space for New Human 
Rights]; see also Henry J. Steiner, Social Rights and Economic Development: Converging Discourses?, 
4 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 25 (1998); James C.N. Paul, The Human Right to Development: Its 
Meaning and Importance, 25 J. Marshall L. Rev. 235 (1992); Anne Orford, Globalization and the 
Right to Development, in People’s Rights 127 (Philip Alston ed., 2001). 
 104. For instance, the United Nations Development Programme now explicitly connects these 
rights in its annual Human Development Reports. See U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Development 
Report 2003, Millennium Development Goals: A Compact Among nations to End Human 
Poverty (2003), available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/ [hereinafter Millennium 
Development Compact].  
 105. See Alan Rosas, The Right to Development, in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
247, 248 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1995) (averring that the human right to development gave 
developing nations a moral basis in which to ground their demands for more equitable distribution of 
worldwide resources from more developed nations).  
 106. Peter Uvin, Human Rights and Development (2004). Uvin argues against this prevailing 
notion by pointing out that both agendas have similar and overlapping goals. To give one example, he 
notes that if a human rights perspective is added to a traditional development goal of providing 
subsistence, then the problem of guaranteeing sufficient food in a country is revised towards identifying 
the factors that limit that availability, that is, “the wide range of mechanisms that exclude some groups 
from services or resources the state makes available; the way discriminatory employment, land, credit, 
inheritance or education policies.” Id. at 161.  
 107. See, e.g., Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, International Human Rights in 
Context: Law, Politics, Morals 247 (2d ed. 2000) (“The interdependence principle, apart from its 
use as a political compromise between advocates of one or two covenants, reflects the fact that the two 
sets of rights can neither logically nor practically be separated in watertight compartments.”); C.B. 
Macpherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval 111-12 (1973) (disputing Berlin’s fixation 
on negative liberty by pointing out the material prerequisites to meaningful choices).  
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theoretically artificial and unsatisfying. 108  Jack Donnelly goes further, 
asserting all human rights “require both positive action and restraint by the 
State if they are going to be effectively implemented.”109 As an example, 
he points out that the right to vote requires both freedom from restraints on 
political expression and affirmative government expenditure in facilitating 
the franchise’s exercise.110  
 Recent United Nations instruments concur with the academic 
consensus and emphasize incorporating these rights. The CEDAW 
demonstrates this integrated approach to human rights by demanding both 
prevention of direct discrimination and reinvention of environments to 
eviscerate the more subtle effects of cultural bias.111 One may say the same 
for recent instruments specifically relating to disabled persons. During the 
1995 World Summit for Social Development, the General Assembly stated 
that ensuring equal employment for disabled persons requires not only re-
organization of the workplace environment, but also direct “measures 
which enhance education and acquisition of skills,” and indirect measures 
such as hiring and retention incentives for employers. 112  Similarly, the 
Committee on the CRC requires creating conditions to ensure disabled 
children’s “dignity” and “self-reliance” by eliminating prejudice and 
promoting “active participation in the community” through meaningful 
access to education, rehabilitation services, and health care.113 The Draft 
Articles likewise challenge the role the constructed environment plays in 
excluding people with disabilities from participating in civil and political life, 
and charges societies to make broad-based changes altering entrenched social 
norms. 114  By juxtaposing positive and negative rights within the same 
scheme, the human right to development ultimately avoids the perils 
associated with their division. In this respect, incorporating the human right to 
                                                                                                                          
 108. See Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic 
Guarantees? 5 (U. of Chicago, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper 
No. 36, 2003) (rights “cannot exist simply with government abstinence”).  
 109. Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights 25 (2d ed. 1998).  
 110. Id.; see also Brad R. Roth, The CEDAW as a Collective Approach to Women’s Rights, 24 
Mich. J. Int’l L. 187, 203 (2002) (“[A] line between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ interferences with the 
range of chosen activity seems not only arbitrary, but potentially obfuscatory, absolving politics of 
responsibility for the greater part of the real impediments to chosen activity, and characterizing as 
‘free’ a polity in which individuals are as effectively constrained, perhaps, as those in an ‘unfree’ 
polity.”). 
 111. Steiner & Alston, supra note 107, at 197 (adding that “[t]he formal removal of barriers 
and the introduction of temporary special measures to encourage the equal participation of both men 
and women in the public life of their societies are essential prerequisites to true equality in political 
life”). 
 112. G.A. Res. S-24/2, para. 67, U.N. Doc A/RES/S-24/2 (July 1, 2000).  
 113. See CRC, supra note 24, at art. 23, para. 1.  
 114. See generally Draft Articles, supra note 42.  
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development into the current disability rights paradigm improves on the 
social model of disability.  
 Though its ability to integrate first- and second-generation rights is 
valuable, the human right to development maintains concerning 
limitations. This model cannot overcome or provide more satisfactory 
solutions to three problems common to human rights frameworks.115 The 
first problem is effective monitoring of international instruments. As one 
commentator has archly but accurately put it, the current monitoring 
system “constitute[s] some of the most powerless, under-funded, 
formulaic, and politically manipulated institutions of the United 
Nations.” 116  This opprobrium may well prove true for monitoring any 
disability human rights treaty. Ultimately, in the absence of either dramatic 
change to the politics of world governance or radical treaty body reform,117 
the efficacy of monitoring any human rights treaty largely depends on 
extra-legal factors that cannot be built into instruments. These concerns 
include moral persuasion, political pressure, and the willingness and ability 
of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots movements to 
raise social awareness.118  
 The second problem the human right to development shares with 
other human rights treaties is that it fails to provide adequate guidance on 
its substance and boundaries. In some measure, this is a practically driven, 
semi-intentional design flaw. As aspirational statements drafted to garner 
widespread support, human rights conventions are often necessarily 
                                                                                                                          
 115. Uvin identifies debates over “Western-centrism” as a fourth, insurmountable concern. Uvin, 
supra note 106, at 31. However, some commentators claim that central themes of human rights theory 
are common to all cultures and faiths, even if expressed in different ways. See, e.g., Hans Kung, A 
Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics (1998); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, 
Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus (1992).  
 116. Uvin, supra note 106, at 140.  
 117. The efficacy of the United Nations treaty system is a subject that far exceeds this Article. 
Briefly, the most recent attempt at overhauling the system was given impetus by the Secretary-
General’s second reform report of 2002, Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further 
Change, U.N. Doc. A/57/387 (Sept. 9, 2002), which calls for more coordination among monitoring 
bodies, greater standardization of reporting requirements, and increased monitoring at the national 
level.  
 118. See Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the Courts?, 
38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 635, 641 (2003) (distinguishing human rights as moral, rather than legal, 
rights). Some exogenous factors are described in Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States, supra 
note 13. Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of 
International Dispute Resolution, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1229, 1303-29 (2003), use game theory to 
demonstrate the efficacy of international judicial decisions in the absence of sanctions, and provides 
empirical data support from the International Court of Justice’s docket. In very stark contrast, Jack 
Landman Goldsmith & Eric. A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2005), proffers a 
realpolitik explanation for international adjudication based on rational actor theory that is largely 
immune from external influence.  
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expressed at a high degree of abstraction. 119  Consequently, these 
instruments’ stated goals often fall short of their objectives, due in part to a 
lack of substantive content. Ambiguous—and sometimes even 
unambiguous—treaty terminology can mean very different things 
depending on a State’s laws, norms, and culture.120  
 The third problem beleaguering the human right to development 
concerns prioritization of resources. Human rights instruments often 
contain language limiting application in relation to the financial 
capabilities of State parties.121 In accordance with these textual limitations, 
States short of funds are more likely to implement rights that are either 
easier to achieve or are perceived as having greater utility or political 
cachet. Conversely, States are less likely to promote rights where 
realization is thought either more challenging, less encompassing, or out of 
political favor.122  
 While only broad institutional solutions can adequately amend 
monitoring deficiencies, Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach deals 
with the concerns about practical content and moral priority of human 
rights, and provides a productive space for understanding their 
implementation. 
B. The Capabilities Approach  
 Philosopher Martha Nussbaum advocates providing individuals with 
the means to achieve full human potential, and enumerates a list of 
“universal” capabilities that describe such flourishing. 123  Her scheme 
                                                                                                                          
 119. See generally Karl E. Klare, Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction: Reflections on 
1989, 25 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 69, 98 (1991).  
 120. See Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, in Human 
Rights: Concepts and Standards 31, 33 (Janusz Symonides ed., 2000).  
 121. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 14, at art. 22 (limiting responsibility “in 
accordance with the organization and resources of each State”); ICESCR, supra note 9, at art. 2, para. 1 
(States must undertake steps “to the maximum of its available resources”); CRC, supra note 24, at art. 
4 (“States parties shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources”). 
Thus, the caution expressed by the Independent Expert that allocation concerns should not be “used as 
a pretext for avoiding action.” U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, 
Working Group on the Right to Dev., Study on the Current State of Progress in the Implementation of 
the Rights to Development, at para. 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/WG.18/2 (July 27, 1999) (prepared by 
Arjun K. Sengupta). 
 122. See David Copp, Equality, Justice, and the Basic Needs, in Necessary Goods: Our 
Responsibilities to Meet Others’ Needs 113, 113 (Gillian Brock ed., 1998) (noting that neither 
egalitarian nor liberal theories regarding distribution of social goods adequately address issues of 
prioritization).  
 123. As part of her continuing research agenda, Nussbaum has applied the capabilities approach to 
women in a number of contexts. To date, the fullest enunciation of her theory, and the one I reference 
most for the sake of convenience, is Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human 
Development: The Capabilities Approach (2000) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Capabilities 
Approach].  
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provides an elegant normative theory addressing human rights aspirations 
and content. As currently comprised, however, Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach excludes certain intellectually disabled individuals and treats 
others as unequal participants by measuring abilities downward from a 
standard of “species typicality.”124  
1. The Capabilities Approach as it Informs the Human Right to 
Development  
 Articulated as a universal feminist political philosophy, Nussbaum’s 
version of the capabilities approach maintains that public political 
arrangements must provide citizens with the means through which to 
develop their full human potential as defined by ten central 
capabilities: life—the faculty to live one’s full lifespan; bodily health—
having good health, including reproductive capability; bodily integrity—
freedom of movement and bodily sovereignty; senses, imagination, and 
thought—cognizing and expressing oneself in a “truly human” way; 
emotions—loving, grieving and forming associations; practical reason—
critical reflection and conscience; affiliation—self-respect, empathy and 
consideration for others; other species—being able to co-exist with other 
species and the biosphere; play—the ability to enjoy recreation; and 
control over one’s political environment—via meaningful participation—
and material surroundings—through property ownership and 
employment.125 While this catalog does not comprise a “complete theory of 
justice,” Nussbaum considers these functions essential because engaging in 
them is a uniquely human, as opposed to animal or mechanical, mode of 
existence. Put another way, Nussbaum maintains that her ten central 
capabilities collectively define “the presence or absence of human life.”126 
 Since each central capability is a separate component of this theory, 
States must provide each at a threshold level to ensure basic human 
functioning, and cannot provide for one component beyond the threshold 
while denying or limiting another. Nussbaum concedes that some of the 
central capabilities include what John Rawls called “natural goods,” or 
commodities occurring serendipitously, the existence and extent of which 
States cannot always balance out (like attractive physical features). 127 
Nonetheless, Nussbaum asserts that political principals can fulfill their 
                                                                                                                          
 124. The notion originates with bioethicist Norman Daniels, who argues that a universal right to 
health care must be circumscribed to instances of ensuring or revising the “normal species functioning” 
necessary for individuals to arrive at the “normal opportunity range” of function within their respective 
societies. See, e.g., Norman Daniels, Just Health Care 26-35 (1985); Norman Daniels, Health-
Care Needs and Distributive Justice, 10 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 146, 158-60 (1981). 
 125. Nussbaum, Capabilities Approach, supra note 123, at 78.  
 126. Id. at 35, 72.  
 127. Rawls, supra note 93, at 62.  
100  CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:75 
obligations by leveling out the social bases underlying the distribution of 
natural goods. Hence, while governments cannot guarantee the emotional 
health of all women, they can create an environment conducive to ensuring 
emotional health through suitable family law, rape prohibition and 
prosecution, and public safety regulation.128  
 Central capabilities are also “combined capabilities,” which 
Nussbaum defines as “internal capabilities combined with suitable external 
conditions for the exercise of the function.”129 As an example, a physically 
healthy woman who has the internal capability for sexual gratification may 
nevertheless lack the combined capability to pursue her sexuality because 
of repressive social constructs, whether religious, moral, or related to 
reproductive health.130 In such a case, the State has not met its obligations 
to its citizenry because it has not provided an environment in which the 
combined capability can be expressed.  
 The capabilities approach avers that all people are individually worthy 
of regard, autonomy, and self-fulfillment. 131  Accordingly, Nussbaum 
rejects the welfare metrics commonly applied in development studies, such 
as per capita GNP and the general utility of wealth maximization. Instead, 
she avers that personalized welfare accounts are more trenchant than those 
derived from broad, anonymous proxies. 132  General economic growth 
“does not by itself improve the situation with regard to literacy and health 
care,” nor does it adequately illuminate the circumstance of any particular 
individual.133 Nussbaum requires that each and every person be treated as an 
end in herself, rather than as the instrument of or agency to the ends of 
others.  
 The central goal of the capabilities approach is to provide individuals 
with the means through which to develop themselves, regardless of whether 
they elect to do so.134 Through her political theory, Nussbaum seeks to endow 
people with the agency to choose.135 Because the functions set forth as central 
                                                                                                                          
 128. Nussbaum, Capabilities Approach, supra note 123, at 82.  
 129. Id. at 84-85 (emphasis in original).  
 130. Id. at 85. 
 131. Ultimately, this tenet is called the “principle of each person as end.” Id. at 56 (emphasis 
omitted). 
 132. This reasoning provides an additional argument against aggregate analysis of public good, for 
an absence of political liberty could not conceivably “be made up for by tremendous economic 
growth.” Id. at 81.  
 133. Id. at 32-33.  
 134. Her list, is therefore, “a list of capabilities or opportunities for functioning, rather than of 
actual functions” because it “protects spaces for people to pursue other functions that they value.” 
Nussbaum, Capabilities Approach, supra note 123, at 74. 
 135. That people would choose not to achieve their own full potential raises a secondary concern, 
namely that of preference deformation. This concept posits that circumstances exist in which people’s 
basic preferences (which they would recognize if unimpeded) are negatively influenced by external 
social forces, such as traditional hierarchies or religious beliefs. Nussbaum’s response, which draws on 
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capabilities are intrinsically rooted in the human condition, they are arguably 
universal in nature. She presumes them to be culturally sensitive because as 
universal values they are not considered to impose external—sometimes 
labeled foreign—moral imperatives on other nations.136  
 Nussbaum’s conclusion that central capabilities “have a very close 
relationship to human rights”137 is overly modest; the capabilities approach 
relates the same objectives espoused in the human right to development. 
Moreover, her capabilities scheme improves the human rights framework 
by providing content to its otherwise abstract aspirations of protecting 
autonomy, ensuring dignity, and developing personal capacity. Yet, 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach falls short as a universal theory because 
it either excludes or only indirectly includes certain individuals with 
intellectual disabilities. 
2. The Capabilities Approach as Under-Inclusive of Some Intellectually 
Disabled Persons  
 Despite the theory’s cogency, disability rights advocates can take 
issue with the capabilities approach for being under-inclusive on two 
grounds.138 First, the approach does not go far enough towards empowering 
disabled persons with the “right to be in the world.”139 Historically, the 
disabled have been among the most marginalized individuals, 140  and 
predicating their social inclusion on notions of societal contribution will 
not improve this status. Second, Nussbaum’s scheme fails to recognize the 
                                                                                                                          
the work of scholars as diverse as Gary Becker, Richard Posner, Thomas Scanlon, and Amartya Sen, is 
that her approach makes the possibility of central capabilities (which should be universally appealing) 
available, but does not force the issue. Id. at 115-22.  
 136. Nussbaum acknowledges that “even if one defends theory as valuable for practice, it may still 
be problematic to use concepts that originate in one culture to describe and assess realities in another.” 
Id. at 36. Conversely, she also notes the cultural arrogance of assuming that particular values originate 
with particular countries, for example, assuming that sex equality is an American construct in the face 
of counter-cultural examples that include India’s passage of a sex-based equal rights amendment in 
1951. Id. at 39. Of course, not everyone agrees with these propositions. For the views of two scholars 
who decry, in varying degrees, the cultural invasiveness of human rights norms, see Michael 
Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (2001); Wendy Brown, States of 
Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (1995).  
 137. Nussbaum, Capabilities Approach, supra note 123, at 97.  
 138. Although I take issue with Nussbaum’s position on capablities as far as individuals with 
intellectual disabilities, I stress my admiration for and agreement with the majority of Nussbaum’s 
work and thank her for a willingness to discuss our different perspectives.  
 139. tenBroek, supra note 58, at 842. Jacobus tenBroek and Floyed Matson made this assertion in 
the context of welfare benefits by arguing that meaningful social participation means not only caring 
for those who are unable to work through the welfare system, but more importantly, assuring that 
disabled persons are able engage in society at large. Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The 
Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 809, 809-10 (1966). 
 140. The point is borne out by reading the ADA’s Legislative Findings section documenting 
adverse conditions encountered by people with disabilities living in the United States, the world’s 
wealthiest nation. See 42 U.S.C § 12101 (2000). 
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full dignity of those functioning below her ten central capabilities. 
Consequently, this constructed minimum excludes certain persons with 
intellectual disabilities from full participation in society.  
 A key ingredient missing from Nussbaum’s model is an adequate 
concept of “participatory justice,” or the ability of disabled persons to have 
meaningful contact with the population at large.141 Undergirding this notion 
is a prevailing normative assumption that in a just society everyone should 
have the ability to interact with and take part in general culture. 142 
Participatory justice parallels the social model’s assertion that, but for the 
existence of artificial barriers, people with disabilities would play an equal 
part in society. It further asserts that a just society makes participation a 
moral imperative. Thus, even if a State cannot financially provide for a full 
range of human rights, it can still acknowledge a moral obligation to 
impart them.143 Accordingly, participatory justice underscores that human 
rights seek the elimination of disability-related barriers to equal social 
participation.144  
 However, by assessing social participation via functionality, 
Nussbaum’s capabilities list limits participatory justice for intellectually 
disabled persons by not sufficiently ameliorating the social invisibility and 
exclusion they experience. Instead, her capabilities list erects barriers to 
social participation similar to the practice of predicating human 
                                                                                                                          
 141. Nussbaum’s model is concerned about participatory justice as evidenced by the inclusion of 
respect and non-humiliation as two key elements. For instance, Nussbaum asserts that Sescha, Eva 
Kittay’s severely disabled daughter, lives a more socially participatory life at a segregated facility than 
she did in her parent’s home. That may well be true, and so Secha has benefited. However, one can 
interpret the capabilities approach to permit people with severe intellectual disabilities to live in group 
homes that (unlike Sescha Kittay’s) are also completely segregated from mainstream society so long as 
the residents interact with their peers and carers in a respectful and non-humiliating manner. Nussbaum 
would likely disagree with this wholly exclusionary situation, but it is one that can be interpreted from 
the way her model is set out. See generally Ann Hubbard, The Major Life Activity of Belonging, 39 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 217 (2004); Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 Ethics 
287 (1999); Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990).  
 142. “[I]ndividuals cannot flourish without their joining with other humans in some sort of 
collective activities.” Anita Silvers, People with Disabilities, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Practical Ethics 300, 318 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2003). 
 143. A State can also consider what practices and capacities it values and then allocate some 
(small) proportion of its restricted resources towards that end. Currently, Malawi is using this approach. 
Correspondence from Minister June Ntabaz to Professor Michael Stein (December 21, 2004) (on file 
with author). A cynical argument can also be made that developing nations eagerly press the United 
Nations towards second-generation rights in order to obligate more developed nations to financially 
assist their implementation.  
 144. This idea animates the Draft Articles. For example, the convention requires States parties to 
“take effective and appropriate measures to enable persons with disabilities to live and to be fully 
included as members of the community” and to be present in all aspects of mainstream society. See, 
e.g., Draft Articles, supra note 42, at art. 19 (“States parties shall take effective and appropriate 
measures to facilitate full enjoyment by persons with disabilities of this right and their full inclusion 
and participation in the community.”). 
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development on economic viability. Conditioning human development on 
economic viability rather than inherent dignity is a deeply troubling notion, 
and one that Nussbaum has rigorously and justifiably criticized.145 The 
application to persons with disabilities is particularly disconcerting because 
historically, mainstream society rationalized disabled persons’ exclusion 
on the assumptions that they were more expensive and contributed less to 
society than non-disabled.146 A stark statement of this perspective is that of 
neo-Hobbesian philosopher David Gauthier. He utilizes this assertion to 
justify ministering to the disabled in a lesser manner than to the elderly, 
proclaiming that while the aged “have paid for their benefits by earlier 
productive activity,” one may speak only “euphemistically of enabling [the 
disabled] to live productive lives, when the services required exceed any 
possible products.”147 A more nuanced treatment of this theme is found in 
the context of the ADA, where empirically unsubstantiated pleas for 
efficiency supply an economically rational motivation for employers to 
withhold accommodations from disabled workers. 148  Such economic 
justification has led to regimes that systematically bar disabled people from 
fulfilling their agency as citizens. 149  The many presumably well-
intentioned yet paternalistic welfare systems that provide subsistence to 
                                                                                                                          
 145. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of 
Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 Pol. Theory 202, 229 (1992) (dismissing the notion that 
macroeconomics can accurately reflect the quality of life within a country because the “measure does 
not even concern itself with the distribution of resources and thus can give good marks to a country 
with enormous inequalities”).  
 146. Nearly all Disability Studies commentators accord some influence (whether resulting in overt 
or unconscious differential treatment) to the phenomenon of “existential anxiety.” The term originates 
with political scientist Harlan Hahn, who asserted that repugnance to disabled bodily difference, 
combined with fear of also attaining such variation in the future, results in a sociological desire to 
segregate people with disabilities from the mainstream. See, e.g., Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical 
Differences: Disability and Discrimination, 44 J. Soc. Issues 39, 43-44 (1988); Harlan Hahn, Towards 
a Politics of Disability: Definitions, Disciplines, and Policies, 22 Soc. Sci. J. 87 (1985). 
 147. David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement 18 n.30 (1986). 
 148. The most thoughtful enunciation of this position is Mark Kelman, who distinguishes between 
the societal norms that exist against “simple discrimination” and those norms which mandate the 
provision of “accommodation.” See Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 Stan. L. 
Rev. 833 (2001); Mark Kelman, Strategy or Principle?: The Choice Between Regulation 
and Taxation (1999); see also Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001) (practices that 
unquestionably discriminate against disabled employees for economic reasons are constitutional 
because “it would be entirely rational” for state employers “to conserve scarce financial resources by 
hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities” rather than accede to ADA requests). 
 149. This is the thrust of the arguments made by historian Deborah Stone in arguing that “[t]he 
very act of defining a disability category determines what is expected of the nondisabled—what 
injuries, diseases, incapacities, and problems they will be expected to tolerate in their normal working 
lives.” Deborah A. Stone, The Disabled State 4 (1984). 
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people with disabilities in lieu of workplace participation are emblematic 
of this problem.150 
 Second, by setting minimal standards, Nussbaum’s list of central 
capabilities fails to acknowledge the full humanity and equality of 
individuals functioning below her idealized norm, especially those with 
intellectual disabilities. Initially, Nussbaum wrote that society ought to 
value individuals with intellectual disabilities on social justice grounds 
unrelated to a capabilities approach. 151  She pointed out the parallels 
between caring for the disabled and caring for the young or elderly, and 
noted women’s unequal role as caregivers in those contexts. 152 
Correspondingly, she maintained that in contrast to the purely reciprocal 
position embodied by social contract theory, social justice requires 
enhancing women’s capabilities so they can provide care to persons with 
disabilities and others in need. 153  But Nussbaum left unaddressed the 
explicit question of whether the capabilities model is applicable to those 
with intellectual disabilities. On the one hand, inclusion of intellectually 
disabled persons seemed implicit. The capabilities approach emphasizes 
human dignity and values individuals as an end. On the other hand, 
inclusion of intellectually disabled persons seemed implausible. Persons 
with reduced cognitive ability to reason or perform other capabilities are 
not embraced by criteria viewing these processes as indicative of being 
“truly human.”154  
 In her latest book, Nussbaum attempts to resolve the problem of 
including intellectually disabled persons in her capabilities approach. In 
doing so she strikes a curious and undesirable compromise by excluding 
some persons with intellectual disabilities from her framework and 
including others only indirectly. 155  Because the capabilities list is “so 
                                                                                                                          
 150. Theresia Degener states the case bluntly: “Persons with disabilities are regarded as being 
incapable of living as autonomous individuals.” Theresia Degener, Disability as a Subject of 
International Human Rights Law and Comparative Discrimination Law, in Different but Equal, 
supra note 11, at 151, 154. See also tenBroek & Matson, supra note 141, at 809-10 (“Throughout 
history the physically handicapped have been regarded as incompetent to aid themselves and therefore 
permanently dependent upon the charity of others . . . .”). 
 151. Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Disabilities: Justice for Mentally Disabled Citizens, 
30 Philosophical Topics 133 (2002). 
 152. Nussbaum, Capabilities Approach, supra note 123. For an extensive treatment of this 
phenomenon, see Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and 
What to Do About It (2000). 
 153. Some social science research supports the notion that caregivers ought to be given priority 
when it comes to redistribution of resources. See, e.g., Avery Russell, Applied Ethics: A Strategy for 
Fostering Professional Responsibility, 28 Carnegie Q. 1, 5 (1980) (case study indicating that 
individuals with vulnerable dependents ought to be preferred over others). 
 154. Nussbaum, Capabilities Approach, supra note 123, at 78. 
 155. Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species 
Membership (2006) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice]. 
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normatively fundamental,” she explains, only those individuals who come 
close to attaining the enumerated functions live a “fully human life” that is 
“worthy of human dignity.”156 Those who are unable to reach these bottom 
lines, including some proportion of the intellectually disabled, are in 
Nussbaum’s view “extremely unfortunate” and exist at a level “beneath 
which a decently dignified life for citizens is not available.” 157  Thus, 
although a just society generally mandates that people with intellectual 
disabilities receive capabilities resources,158 some will not; for some others, 
society must channel funds “through a suitable arrangement of 
guardianship.”159  
 With these assertions Nussbaum subtly alters her previous capabilities 
approach, requiring a minimal level of function as a prerequisite to full 
participation. Because certain intellectually disabled persons are without 
the ability to achieve each of Nussbaum’s bottom lines, even dignity and 
justice cannot justify the direct allocation of resources for them to flourish. 
Thus, while Nussbaum’s capabilities framework can apply to poverty—
indeed, it derives from Amartya Sen’s position on poverty alleviation—it 
cannot apply to certain instances of intellectual disability. This is ironic for 
three reasons. First, there is a strong factual and causal interrelationship 
between poverty and disability. Second, while Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach adheres to established norms of functionality, Sen’s original 
capabilities approach does not require a threshold to guide or justify 
allocations to individuals with different needs.160 Third, and consequently 
more perplexing, Nussbaum’s analysis falls prey to the same error she 
identifies as plaguing social contract theory, (and especially Rawls) 
namely, that social goods beneficiaries are required to provide adequate 
contributions back to society to justify receiving equal distribution.161 
                                                                                                                          
 156. Id. at 181. 
 157. Id. at 192, 179. 
 158. Id. at 98-100. 
 159. Id. at 193; see also id. at 195-211 (providing domestic and international examples of 
guardianship that “maximize autonomy”). 
 160. Distinguishing distribution of goods from the capability to use them, Sen rejects the use of a 
resources or primary goods list as the sole basis of comparison. Amartya Sen, Inequality 
Reexamined 31, 38 (1992). 
 161. An explanatory note is warranted. Throughout her scholarship, and especially in Frontiers 
of Justice, Nussbaum takes great pains to rebut the position maintained by John Rawls and other 
philosophers subscribing to social contract theory. Those commentators maintain that to justify the 
distribution of primary goods, recipients must adequately contribute to society. In other words, the 
prevailing philosophical belief she strongly rebuts is that resource distribution should be tied to an 
individual’s capacity to contribute to others. It is therefore odd that the idea of contribution has crept 
into Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. Yet by setting species typicality as the level of capability that is 
the threshold for cutting off resource distribution, Nussbaum applies this determination both as a 
descriptive and a normative qualification, and in so doing Frontiers of Justice may be read as letting 
this idea back in. 
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 Ensuring the dignity of disabled people requires an opposite approach. 
It entails recognizing them for their intrinsic value as people and not as a 
means towards other ends. This dignitary perspective compels societies to 
acknowledge that persons with disabilities are valuable because of their 
inherent human worth rather than their net marginal product. Such an 
integrated human rights approach asks about the qualities of an individual 
and how developing her talents can benefit both her and society. By 
amending Nussbaum’s scheme to treat these problems of under-inclusion, 
it is possible to create a space within which to more fully understand the 
content of human rights. The next Section discusses how the disability 
human rights paradigm serves this goal. 
C. The Disability Human Rights Paradigm 
 Combining the best elements of the social model of disability, the 
human right to development, and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, the 
disability human rights paradigm provides a comprehensive framework for 
ensuring the development of individual talent. Like the social model of 
disability, the disability human rights framework stresses society’s role in 
constructing disability and its responsibility to rectify disability-based 
exclusion. Like the human right to development, it urges the 
interrelationship of first- and second-generation rights. And like the 
capabilities approach, it states a moral imperative for societies to provide 
resources for developing human potential. Its core modifications include a 
focus on the cultivation of individual talents rather than Nussbaum’s 
minimum “universal” levels of functioning, and an emphasis on intrinsic 
                                                                                                                          
  This is because Nussbaum’s use of species typicality is both factual and normative. As 
applied, it is not only the level of capability that humans typically enjoy, but also the threshold level 
demanded for a life of human dignity. But why should the level of capability typical of the species also 
be the level needed for achieving or preserving a dignified life? If this equation is intuitive, it probably 
is because we associate species typical levels of capability as being valuable because they enable us to 
care for ourselves and to be perceived as contributing to others. By contrast, lower than typical species 
functioning is undignified and not truly human because those individuals are a burden to society. 
Nussbaum frames her arguments in terms of choice, and values species typical levels of capability as an 
important justification for allocating resources to bring everyone up to these levels. Her capability 
approach is set forth in terms of agency, and Nussbaum believes that people need not exercise their 
capabilities. In fact, however, social pressure to exercise capabilities and their associated functioning is 
a familiar phenomenon.  Consider, for example, the debate over cochlear implants. Once the 
technological capability exists to enable deaf people to access aural communication, social pressure is 
brought to bear on deaf individuals to use this technology rather than rely on sign-language interpreters 
precisely because the species typical mode of communicating makes them better able to contribute 
without being burdensome to others. 
I thank Anita Silvers for pointing out the difficulties (possibly insurmountable) of invoking species 
typicality as a standard without also inviting the stigmatization and exclusion of those who cannot be 
brought up to the standard.  
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human worth rather than contribution as the moral foundation for state 
resource allocation.  
 The disability human rights framework focuses on allowing 
individuals to achieve their specific talents, rather than focusing on a lack 
of overall capabilities as measured against a functional baseline. Talents 
are more specific to individuals than capabilities, and by definition are not 
universally shared. Utilizing a disability framework allows society to 
appreciate potential from the bottom up rather than from the top down 
through developing people’s talents to ensure their flourishing. A disability 
human rights paradigm maintains that developing one’s talents is at the 
core of being human, and one must view talent as its own end rather than a 
means to another end—such as achieving species-typical levels of 
functioning for certain capabilities. The development of talent is a moral 
imperative that all societies owe to each of their citizens, even if citizens’ 
relative talents are unequal. Thus, the disability human rights paradigm’s 
view of human life is not only about individual flourishing, but also about 
dignity, autonomy, and individuality, and so necessitates a greater view of 
all persons contributing to and participating in society. Moreover, the 
capabilities approach bars distribution of resources that do not increase 
agency to baseline levels in all ten categories. By contrast, the disability 
paradigm focuses on the development of individual talent and permits 
resource distribution to individuals whose agency can be increased in any 
category. In doing so, the disability framework avoids the all-or-nothing 
requirement of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, and permits greater 
flexibility when States prioritize their resource allocation.162  
 Considering some of Nussbaum’s examples illustrating how the 
capabilities approach applies to intellectually disabled persons helps 
illustrate the inclusive difference between a disability human rights 
paradigm and her framework. While arguing on social justice grounds for 
the care of people with intellectual disabilities, Nussbaum describes the 
lives of three intellectually disabled children. Philosopher Eva Feder 
Kittay’s daughter Sesha has cerebral palsy and is severely intellectually 
disabled. Public intellectual Michael Bérubé’s son Jamie has Down 
syndrome. 163  Nussbaum’s nephew, Arthur, has Asperger and Tourette 
                                                                                                                          
   162.  To illustrate: Nussbaum’s capabilities approach does not provide resource distribution to 
child prodigies or savants to enable either group to exceed a species typical norm by developing their 
special talents. This is because resources to these individuals (assuming they were otherwise capable of 
attaining the ten capabilities) would stop being distributed at the point that they achieved an average 
human functioning level. By contrast, a disability human rights approach would provide resources for 
the members of both groups who are impaired in some respects but gifted in others to exceed species 
typical levels of the capabilities they can achieve, regardless of whether they could attain species 
typicality in all ten capabilities. 
 163. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, supra note 155, at 133-36.  
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syndromes.164 Each has a distinct personality and needs. Sesha loves pretty 
dresses, dancing to music in her wheelchair, and returning her parents’ 
hugs.165 Jamie is a fan of B.B. King, Bob Marley, and the Beatles, and has 
a clever wit.166 Arthur deeply understands the theory of relativity and other 
scientific quandaries, and is politically savvy.167  
 According to Nussbaum’s central capabilities metric, these children 
may not become sufficiently economically productive to repay society for 
the resources they use.168 Sesha and Jamie are unlikely to achieve practical 
reasoning capabilities.169 Arthur has “few social skills” and “seems unable 
to learn them.”170 Yet each child is endowed with a minimum level of at 
least two of the ten central capabilities: emotions and play.171 And each has 
talents that can be developed and encouraged. Sesha expresses emotions 
and affinity.172 Jamie and Arthur are likely to be employed and exercise a 
range of citizenship abilities.173  
 However, because Sesha (in contrast to Jamie and Arthur) will not 
achieve central capabilities even with greater resource distribution, and 
because she needs the entire range of capabilities to live a “fully human 
life” that is “worthy of human dignity,” two possibilities arise according to 
Nussbaum: “either we say that Sesha has a different form of life altogether, 
or we say that she will never be able to have a flourishing human life, 
despite our best efforts.” 174  Since Sesha is not vegetative and displays 
human qualities of affection and affinity, Nussbaum concludes that Sesha 
is not a different form of life. With a “flourishing human life” also out of 
the question, Nussbaum concludes that a just society would, if 
scientifically possible, have genetically removed Sesha’s disabilities. 175 
Accordingly, Sesha is excluded from Nussbaum’s capabilities approach 
because she is deemed incapable of reaching the required functional levels.  
 Not surprisingly, Eva Kittay (as Sesha’s mother) argues that persons 
with intellectual disabilities ought to be respected for their intrinsic value 
                                                                                                                          
 164. Id. at 97. 
 165. Eva Feder Kittay, Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency 166, 
172, 154-55 (1999); Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, supra note 155, at 96, 134. 
 166. Michael Bérubé, Life as We Know it: A Father, A Family, and an Exceptional 
Child 147, 155 (1996); Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, supra note 155, at 97, 133. 
 167. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, supra note 155, at 96-98. Distressed over the modality of 
President Bush’s 2000 election, Arthur insisted on referring to him as the “Resident.” Id. at 170.  
 168. Id. at 128. 
 169. Id. at 94-96. 
 170. Id. at 96. 
 171. Id. at 96-98, 134.  
 172. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, supra note 155, at 96-98, 134. 
 173. Id. at 98-99, 128.  
 174. Id. at 181, 187. 
 175. Id. at 192-93. 
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as human beings.176 To conclude, as Nussbaum does, that “Sesha’s life is . . 
. unfortunate, in a way that the life of a contented chimpanzee is not 
unfortunate,” because her capabilities are tragically out of step with those 
of most members of her species community, is itself out of step with the 
notion that the flourishing of each individual is itself a moral imperative.177  
 The disability human rights paradigm adopts Kittay’s view on this 
point. 178  The framework seeks to encourage the talents of all children 
because their human dignity is equal to that of children without intellectual 
disabilities—not because they are able to rise to an expected functional 
level. 179  In taking this stance, the disability human rights framework 
likewise rejects Nussbaum’s position that Sesha, and people like her, 
cannot live a “fully human life” or that those lives cannot be “decently 
dignified” or “worthy of human dignity.”180  
 Returning to Nussbaum’s other examples, her capabilities approach 
would distribute resources to develop Jamie and Arthur’s potential. She 
sees the expense as justified, even if the resources required by each child 
are much greater than those required by others, because everyone deserves 
to be brought as close as possible to the standard level of functioning 
shared by the majority of society. Thus, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach 
includes persons with intellectual disabilities who (unlike Sesha) are able 
                                                                                                                          
 176. Kittay stresses, in the communitarian tradition, the nature of our interconnectedness with one 
another and the value that connection creates regardless of the range of our capabilities. This is 
because, in her view, severely disabled persons increase their friends’ and families’ agency for caring 
and moral connection. Kittay, supra note 165. As stated by one feminist scholar, “a relational 
conception of the self suggests that we come to know ourselves and others only in a network of 
interactive relationships and that this shapes and is necessary for exercising self-determining 
capabilities.” Christine Koggel, Perspectives on Equality: Constructing a Relational 
Approach 127-28 (1998). Put another way, we all depend on one another, and develop in relation to 
each other. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 
Yale J. L. & Fem. 7, 12 (1989) (“[R]elatedness is not, as our [liberal] tradition teaches, the antithesis 
of autonomy, but a literal precondition of autonomy, and interdependence a constant component of 
autonomy.”). 
 177. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, supra note 155, at 192. 
 178. As Belden Fields noted, “[h]uman potentialities are developed within a web of cultural, 
economic, and social relationships that are both facilitating and constraining.” A. Belden Fields, 
Rethinking Human Rights for the New Millennium 76-77 (2003). For ways that disability 
theory can learn from both feminist and communitarian theory, see Carlos A. Ball, Looking for Theory 
in all the Right Places: Feminist and Communitarian Elements of Disability Discrimination Law, 66 
Ohio St. L. J. 105 (2005). 
 179. In this way, the gap in Nussbaum’s capabilities theory dovetails with Norman Daniels’s 
perception of disability, namely, that those individuals with disabilities for whom redistribution of 
health care resources would fail to help achieve a normal range of opportunity ought not to receive that 
social wherewithal. See, e.g., Norman Daniels, Justice and Health Care, in Health Care Ethics 290 
(Donald VanDeVeer & Tom Regan eds., 1987) (maintaining that society ought to redistribute resources 
in the form of health care to those disabled people whose receipt would enable their function).  
 180. One must also wonder who would care for Sesha under Nussbaum’s capabilities approach if 
Eva Kittay was not able to provide support. 
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to achieve baseline functions. However, these individuals are included in 
the capabilities scheme only by proxy through their respective guardians, 
and do not directly receive resources. 181  Consequently, the capabilities 
approach denies their individual autonomy. 
 In contrast to this surrogacy arrangement, the disability human rights 
paradigm emphasizes the equal dignity of all persons, and acknowledges 
their autonomy in directing their own development. Accordingly, some 
individuals may require the provision of guardians or others to facilitate 
effective use of state resources towards enabling their talents, but the initial 
right to those resources is not contingent on intervening proxies. The 
disability framework, therefore, continues to focus on personal dignity as a 
key element in human rights discourse, whereas Nussbaum’s approach 
continues to use functional ability as a metric to justify distribution. That 
is, the disability perspective closely echoes classic human rights theory in 
asserting that full equality is an intrinsic good to which everyone is 
entitled.182  
 In addition to bringing the existing goals of human rights discourse 
into view, the disability human rights paradigm can also refocus these 
aspirations through an emphasis on individual need. The next Part explores 
the potential of extending a disability paradigm to other human rights 
frameworks, and discusses the subsequent implications. 
IV 
Extending the Disability Human Rights Paradigm  
 The disability human rights paradigm can be extended retrospectively 
to groups already protected under United Nations instruments, as well as 
prospectively to people not currently protected. Considering these 
possibilities causes us to rethink the human rights agenda in different ways 
and toward different ends.  
A. Retrospectively 
 Recent identity-specific human rights instruments integrate first- and 
second-generation rights as a means of protecting targeted populations.183 
In practice, however, the holistic approach of the human right to 
                                                                                                                          
 181. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, supra note 155, at 128-34.  
 182. For a general jurisprudential argument along much the same line, see Larry S. Temkin, 
Inequality (1993). 
 183. The ICERD targets racial discrimination that has “the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.” ICERD, supra 
note 22, at part 1, art. 1. The CRC, likewise combining first- and second-generation rights, recognizes 
“that every child has the inherent right to life” and charges parties to “ensure to the maximum extent 
possible the survival and development of the child.” CRC, supra note 24, at art. 6, paras. 1-2.  
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development has not been effectively enforced,184 and has been subjected 
to criticism precisely because of its steadfast linkage of first- and second-
generation rights.185 The disability rights framework provides us with a 
strong reminder of how important it is to transcend this divide rather than 
ask what type of right has precedence for human rights. This is in large part 
because the attitudes motivating disability-based exclusion frequently 
manifest in the creation of a prohibitive environment. Ameliorating such 
barriers underscores the notion that ensuring equality in any meaningful sense 
requires not only the assertion of negative rights, but also the reconstruction 
of our world through positive initiatives if we mean to value and include 
every individual’s participation. For the disability human rights paradigm, 
neither type of right is more important than the other. The fact that each is 
integral suggests international frameworks need to utilize and embrace 
both equally.186 
 The CEDAW offers a particularly clear example of a failed 
application of the integrated human rights model. In order to advance the 
concept of a State’s obligation to establish equality between men and 
women, the treaty calls for parties to eliminate all forms of discrimination 
against women and “[t]o take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women by any person, organization or 
                                                                                                                          
 184. Indeed, many NGOs consider the enforcement of economic, social, and cultural rights as 
either pragmatically infeasible or beyond their basic mandates. Compare, e.g., Aryeh Neier, Taking 
Liberties: Four Decades in the Struggle for Rights xxix-xxx (2003) (President of the Open 
Society Institute asserts that economic, social, and cultural rights are not legitimate rights), with 
Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an 
International Human Rights Organization, 26 Hum. Rts. Q. 63 (2004) (Executive Director of Human 
Rights Watch explains that NGOs are most effective, and so concentrate, on using shaming methods 
against clear first-generation rights violations), with Leonard S. Rubenstein, How International Human 
Rights Organizations Can Advance Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Response to Kenneth 
Roth, 26 Hum. Rts. Q. 845 (2004) (Executive Director of Physicians for Human Rights points out that 
NGOs need not choose one generation of right over another, but can seek justice in both instances by 
collaborating with peer organizations), and Alston, Making Space for New Human Rights, supra note 
103 (human rights doyen criticizes Amnesty International for representing its mandate as enforcing the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but in reality only implementing parts of that treaty).  
 185. Recall the discussions, many centering on China, about how some nations prioritize either CP 
or ESC at the expense of the other. See, e.g., Charles H. Brower II, NAFTA’s Investment 
Chapter: Initial Thoughts About Second-Generation Rights, 36 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1533, 1536-
45 (2003) (discussing the fundamental differences between the two forms of rights in practice, and 
Western nations’ reluctance to provide ESC rights ordered in the ICESCR).  
 186. See Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (2d 
ed. 1980). Alternatively, Shue sets forth three State obligations in relation to human rights: the duties to 
respect, protect, and fulfill human rights. The first two may be thought of as requiring a State to refrain 
from violating an individual’s human rights and to protect that person from violations by non-State 
actors. The third, however, mandates the State to proactively and positively provide the means by 
which to achieve human rights.  
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enterprise.” 187  To transform women’s role and place in society, the 
CEDAW further mandates States parties modify behavior patterns arising 
from stereotyped notions of either sex as inferior or superior.188 As a hard 
law treaty, the CEDAW is an ambitious attempt to rework the social 
geography by interweaving first- and second-generation rights—attempting 
to effect deep legal, social, and cultural transformation of women’s role in 
society.189  
 Despite the CEDAW’s structure, assertions of women’s rights under 
the convention often invoke only first-generation civil and political 
rights.190 By this limiting invocation, practitioners have fallen in step with 
early—and now superseded—feminist scholars who eschewed gender 
difference by arguing for equal treatment on the basis of sameness, rather 
than essentializing the significance of difference to understanding women’s 
equality. 191  This tension between absolute notions of sameness and 
difference in asserting equal treatment parallels the difference of opinion 
between social model advocates and those seeking to incorporate second-
generation rights into the disability discourse. Ironically, this type of 
dichotomous perspective is exactly what the CEDAW attempts to forestall 
by embracing notions of formal justice (as sameness) and redistributive 
justice (as difference) thereby attempting to avoid the artificial divide 
                                                                                                                          
 187. CEDAW, supra note 23, at 194, arts. 1-2. The CEDAW defines discrimination as any action 
that impairs women’s full and equal enjoyment of their human rights. CEDAW, supra note 23, at 194, 
art. 1. See generally Renee Holt, Women’s Rights and International Law: The Struggle for Recognition 
and Enforcement, 1 Colum. J. Gender & L. 117 (1991); Natalie Kaufman Hevener, 
International Law and the Status of Women (1983). 
 188. CEDAW, supra note 23, at 195, art. 5. 
 189. See, e.g., M. Christina Luera, No More Waiting For Revolution: Japan Should Take Positive 
Action To Implement the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, 13 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 611, 615-16 (2004) (discussing the broad and ambitious goals of 
the CEDAW in Japan). 
 190. Lisa A. Crooms, Indivisible Rights and Intersectional Identities or, “What do Women’s 
Human Rights Have to do With the Race Convention?”, 40 How. L. J. 619, 627 (1997), discusses the 
general conception of first-generation rights as privileged over second-generation rights, and applies 
that concept to women’s rights. This in turn has affected the practice of NGOs and other entities 
monitoring human rights violations. See generally Katarina Tomasevski, Development Aid and 
Human Rights Revisited 113-14 (1993) (explaining that human rights are thought to prevent states 
from abusing people, while development is typically aimed at increasing economic growth and 
satisfying basic needs). For a comparative analysis of how women’s civil and political rights are 
asserted, see Jessica Neuwirth, Inequality Before the Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex 
Discriminatory Laws Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women and Through the Beijing Platform for Action, 18 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 19 (2005). However, 
these complaints have not targeted the broader remedies that could be invoked under the CEDAW 
provision requiring States to “modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct” that perpetuate 
stereotypical gender roles. Laura Grenfell, The Participation of Afghan Women in the Reconstruction 
Process, 12 Hum. Rts. Brief 22, 22-23 (2004). 
 191. The point is made by Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 
Harv. Women’s. L. J. 89 (1996); Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of 
Exclusion in Feminist Thought (1988). 
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between positive and negative rights.192 This dynamic also goes against 
contemporary feminist theory advocating transcendence of the sameness-
difference debate. As one commentator astutely noted, “the CEDAW 
framework, which embraces both universalism and particularism to some 
degree, is probably the best and perhaps the only available legal strategy 
for escaping [the difficulties of] rights-based essentialism.”193 
 Similarly, under a disability human rights paradigm the source and 
type of equality—whether equal treatment or equal opportunity—is 
irrelevant. However, because attitudes fomenting disability-related 
exclusion manifest to a greater degree in critiquing an environment’s social 
construction, the framework provides an exemplar for why and how first- 
and second-generation rights applicable to women should be viewed and 
implemented holistically.  
 In recognizing the interrelationship of first- and second-generation 
rights, the disability human rights paradigm is not different in kind from 
the human rights vision of other treaties, and in fact should be viewed as 
kindred to the CEDAW. Accordingly, adding disability protections to the 
existing human rights canon simply acknowledges the extent to which 
“neutral” attitudes manifest in unnecessary and avoidable exclusion, and 
makes clear the deep necessity of retrenching institutions and the social 
situations they create and maintain. In so doing, the disability human rights 
framework reaffirms a woman’s fundamental right against discrimination, 
and underscores a woman’s right to a supportive landscape. However, the 
disability dynamic also has the potential for responding to individual need 
over group-based identity. This alternative, more ambitious implication 
would create a dramatically different, although not mutually exclusive, 
perspective on reconfiguring human rights.  
B. Prospectively 
 In theory, global provisions contained in hard laws such as the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR protect all humans equally.194 In reality, individuals not 
currently specified under hard law treaties—for example, sexual minorities 
and the poor—must fall under an additional protected identity criterion to 
                                                                                                                          
 192. See generally Nicola Lacey, Feminist Legal Theory and the Rights of Women, in Gender 
and Human Rights 13, 51 (Karen Knop ed., 2004); Hilary Charlesworth, Alienating Oscar? Feminist 
Analysis of International Law, in Reconceiving Reality: Women and International law 1 
(Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993). 
 193. Lacey, supra note 191, at 13, 51; Karen Engle, After the Collapse of the Public/Private 
Distinction: Strategizing Women’s Rights, in Reconceiving Reality, supra note 192, at 143, 155; see 
also Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A 
Feminist Analysis (2000).  
 194. See discussion supra Part I.A.; see also Michael Freeman, Human Rights: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach 60 (2002) (defining civil rights as “deriv[ing] from the laws or customs 
of particular societies,” whereas human rights are those one has simply by virtue of being human).  
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receive human rights recognition. The disability human rights paradigm 
can solve this problem and bring both sexual minorities and the poor 
within human rights protection. Protecting the rights of sexual minorities 
advances the disability human rights framework’s goal of eliminating the 
notion that atypical people are of lesser worth. Granting poor people the 
opportunity to develop human agency advances the paradigm’s aspiration 
of responding to individual need. Extending rights protection to these two 
groups—and the individuals within—causes us to rethink the objectives 
animating a human rights agenda.195  
 One way to view human rights is to consider them existing along a 
continuum that progressively extends towards marginalized groups. New 
instruments are thus vehicles through which to remove mistaken 
justifications for socially constructed exclusion.196 Prior to addressing the 
needs of disabled persons, the global community recognized the rights of 
other excluded groups through enactment of identity-specific instruments 
that went beyond the universal coverage of the ICCPR and the ICESCR. 
Consequently, prejudicial social conventions directed at members of these 
groups are now considered morally unacceptable and are legally 
prohibited. 197  Disability-based human rights—reflected in both existing 
soft laws and the evolving Draft Articles—are the most recent instruments 
empowering a socially excluded group with human rights.198  
                                                                                                                          
 195. Jerry Mashaw has suggested that, when discussing disability-related policy choices, 
foundational issues should be eschewed in favor of pragmatic and prudential considerations. See 
generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First Principles, 31 San Diego L. Rev. 211, 221 (1994). I agree 
that policy discourse ought to include concrete proposals, and so proffer a vision of what a disability 
human rights paradigm would look like, but strongly disagree that “just” theorizing is inadequate. See 
also Martha C. Nussbaum, Why Practice Needs Ethical Theory: Particularism, Principle, and Bad 
Behavior, in The Path of the Law and its Influence: The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr. 50 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000) (asserting that philosophical theorizing is a necessary ingredient in 
analyzing large systemic issues).  
 196. For parallels of this perspective within the race and sex civil rights categories, see Mary F. 
Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41 Hastings L. J. 471, 
489-90 (1990) (noting that “[s]ex stereotyping in the workplace is embedded in a complicated matrix of 
interlocking beliefs” based on socially constructed definitions of “male” and “female”); see also 
Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331 (1988) (noting the pervasive and racist nature of 
seemingly neutral legal norms).  
 197. Adherents of behavioral economic scholarship would argue that a law’s very existence, in 
turn, shapes individual preferences by changing their taste for specific outcomes beyond the traditional 
effect of sanctions through altering behavior. This can be either because the new law carries a symbolic 
social meaning, or because it affects the way individuals mediate that symbolic social meaning. For a 
survey of the literature and an initial application of the theory to disability law, see Michael Ashley 
Stein, Under the Empirical Radar: An Initial Expressive Law Analysis of the ADA, 90 U. Va. L. Rev. 
1151, 1181 (2004). 
 198. Interestingly, while disability is protected in the United States at the federal level, sexual 
orientation is not. The opposite was true in Europe until Article Thirteen of the European Convention 
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 The theories underlying the disability human rights paradigm can be 
used to extend protections to sexual minorities—most typically gays and 
lesbians—subjected to pervasive and systemic discrimination in many 
countries, if not worldwide. 199  At the same time, some commentators 
acknowledge that sexual minorities should receive negative rights 
protection, but argue that they are an inappropriate target for second-
generation rights. This is because, in their view, sexual minorities are not 
necessarily economically worse off due to social exclusion. 200  This 
proposition is empirically and normatively flawed. Empirically, it is highly 
questionable that sexual minorities have not experienced monetary harm 
through discriminatory experiences. Much like other minority group 
members, sexual minorities do not invest in and develop their potential if 
certain career paths or opportunities are deemed unattainable. 201  And 
sexual minorities are not in a position to challenge exclusion from 
                                                                                                                          
was amended to include disability. M. A. Stein, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union, 62 
Cam. L. J. 508, 508-09 (2003). 
 199. See generally William N. Eskridge, Gaylaw: Challenging the Apartheid of the 
Closet (1999). Doing so, however, first requires acknowledging the socially contingent nature of 
many cultural norms that are otherwise taken for granted as “natural” and “normal.” As observed by 
Robert Gordon: “[T]he power exerted by a legal regime consists [of] . . . its capacity to persuade people 
that the world described in its images and categories is the only attainable world in which a sane person 
would want to live.” Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57, 109 (1984). See 
also Alan Hyde, Bodies of Law 231 (1997) (“Law veils its own power . . . by pretending to find 
what it in fact makes itself.”). These norms include, among others, heterosexuality, opposite sex 
monogamy, and male-female human reproduction. See generally Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation 
and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Arguments from Immutability, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 503 
(1994). Each of these conditions has a strong counterfactual. Consider homosexuality, same sex unions, 
and the increasingly prevalent use of scientifically assisted reproduction. As to the former, numerous 
articles are published in the Journal of Homosexuality; as to the latter, see Janet L. Dolgin, Defining 
the Family: Law, Technology, and Reproduction in an Uneasy Age (1997). Accepting one 
version of social ordering over another is a matter of communal choice, not biological or logical 
necessity. Understanding this elective as an elective paves the way forward for equal treatment of 
sexual minorities. See generally Janet E. Halley, The Politics of The Closet: Towards Equal Protection 
for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 915 (1989). Admittedly, some people do not 
feel that sexual minorities are an appropriate group for either civil or human rights protection. This 
sentiment has been borne out in recent years in the United States, as demonstrated both by the defeat in 
Congress of a bill which would have prohibited workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation.  
See Chai R. Feldblum, The Federal Gay Civil Rights Bill: From Bella to ENDA, in Creating 
Change: Sexuality, Public Policy, and Civil Rights 149 (John D’Emilio et al. eds., 2000) 
(describing the failure to pass the proposed federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act).  This 
sentiment is also demonstrated by the passage in eleven states during the 2004 election of same-sex 
marriage ban referenda. See generally Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex 
Marriage: Learning from Brown v. Board of Education and its Aftermath, 14 Wm. & Mary Bill of 
Rts. J. 1493 (2006). 
 200. This is also a dilemma that Nussbaum argues causes difficulty to Rawls’s theory because his 
allocation of primary goods is based on insufficiently nuanced distribution principles. See Nussbaum, 
Frontiers of Justice, supra note 155, at 178-84. 
 201. See generally M.V. LEE BADGETT, MONEY, MYTHS, AND CHANGE: THE ECONOMIC LIVES OF 
LESBIANS AND GAY MEN (2001) (empirically debunking commonly held myths of homosexual 
affluence). 
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particular prospects if they do not first consider those options viable.202 
However, even if sexual minorities who are dissuaded from thriving in a 
particular manner end up economically well off, they still suffer violations 
to individual dignity and personal flourishing. This is particularly true if 
they pursue social advancement by repressing elements of their 
identities. 203  Extending disability human rights to sexual minorities 
remedies this problem by addressing historical and group-based 
subordination.204  
 The disability-based framework also promises an alternative, 
ambitious reconfiguring of human rights by moving from group-based 
protection to individualized assessment. This shift is dramatically 
illustrated by expanding rights protection to the poor, an idea advocated by 
Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen.205 Because Sen avoids the language of 
human rights—his assertions arise from development economics—I 
attempt to add to his powerful assertions by framing them in terms of 
rights. Thus the disability human rights paradigm acts as a bridge between 
group-based rights discourse and Sen’s progressive vision that responds to 
individual need.206  
                                                                                                                          
 202. Like other self-fulfilling prophecies, this is a Catch-22: certain workers are disadvantaged in 
the workplace because they are believed to have lower net productivity values. In turn, those workers 
invest less in their own human capital because they believe that they will be disadvantaged in the 
workplace. See David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in 
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 Geo. L.J. 1619, 1640 (1991) (“[S]tatistical 
discrimination encourages minorities to underinvest in human capital, which in turn makes statistical 
discrimination rational.”).  
 203. Kenji Yoshino argues that sexual minorities assimilate in three different ways: converting, 
(changing their underlying identity) passing, (retaining their underlying identity but masking it to 
observers) and covering (retaining and disclosing their underlying identity, while allowing it to be 
revealed to acute observers). Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 Yale L.J. 769 (2002). For sociological 
accounts of the effect that identity repression has on gay men, see Ilan H. Meyer, Minority Stress and 
Mental Health in Gay Men, 3 J. Health & Soc. Behav. 38, 39-42 (1995), and James D. Woods & 
Jay H. Lucas, The Corporate Closet: The Professional Lives of Gay Men in America 74-75 
(1993). 
 204. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 245, 247-49 (1983); Paul 
Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. rev. 1, 7-8 (1976).  
 205. For representative examples of his enunciation, see Amartya Sen, Development as 
Freedom (1999) [hereinafter Sen, Development as Freedom]; Sen, Development as Capability 
Expansion, supra note 5, at 94. Briefly stated, Nussbaum’s framework arises from Aristotelian 
principles and is harmonious with much of what Sen argues, but also differs in several significant ways. 
For an elaboration of these differences, see David A. Crocker, Functioning and Capability: The 
Foundations of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s Development Ethic, 20 Pol. Theory 584 (1992); David A. 
Crocker, Functioning and Capability: The Foundations of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s Development Ethic, 
Part II, in Women, Culture, and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities 153 (Martha C. 
Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995). 
 206. Although I reframe matters of distributive justice in this Article using “rights talk,” one could 
also use the currency of “welfare,” understood objectively rather than subjectively in terms of 
preference satisfaction. I elect “rights talk” mainly for its strategic advantage. It is easier to enshrine a 
normative principle in a legal document, like a treaty, while acknowledging that there might not be a 
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 Poverty arises from and is perpetuated by multidimensional factors 
requiring systemic responses.207 Beyond an obvious lack of wealth in the 
material sense, being poor translates into diminished health, reduced access 
to education and other basic social goods, marginalized participation in 
political processes, and an overall diminished ability to develop personal 
talent. 208  It is highly appropriate for the United Nations Millennium 
development projects to focus on poverty alleviation,209  for the annual 
United Nations Development Reports to recognize poverty as a central 
metric,210 and for the World Bank to vow to focus on poverty alleviation in 
addition to issuing loans to developing nations. 211  These international 
bodies recognize that long term, effective responses to poverty are 
inextricably linked to the enhancement of human rights.212 
 In developing his thesis treating poverty alleviation as an 
economic/political right, Sen argued that income deprivation is capability 
deprivation; it deprives the poor access to essential goods and services.213 
In other words, redistributing wealth provides persons living in 
impoverished conditions the means to achieve employment, education, 
                                                                                                                          
difference in result from utilizing other currencies. On the “choice of currency issue,” see Richard J. 
Arneson, Welfare Should be the Currency of Justice, 30 Canadian J. Phil. 497 (2000).  
 207. For a perspective by the Chair of the Millennium Development Goals, see Jeffrey D. Sachs, 
The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (2005).  
 208. “Poverty both affects, and is affected by, other human rights violations.” Joe W. Pitts III, The 
First U.N. Social Forum: History and Analysis, 31 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 297, 298 (2002); see 
generally David Durman, The Dynamics of Poverty and Race in South Africa, 1994-1999, 9 Geo. 
Public Pol’y Rev. 69, 70 (2003) (“Lack of access to health care, education, and employment 
opportunities also increase a household’s likelihood of poverty.”).  
 209. Specifically, the United Nations aims to halve the proportion of people living in poverty or 
hunger, as defined by earning less than one dollar a day, by 2015. See Millennium Development 
Compact, supra note 104.  
 210. See Millennium Development Compact, supra note 104; U.N. Dev. Programme, 
Human Development Report 1997, available at http://ww.undp.org. 
 211. See Deepa Narayan et al., Voices of the Poor: Crying Out for Change 32 (2000) 
(the World Bank’s position “reinforces the case for making the well-being of those who are worse off 
the touchstone for policy and practice”).  
 212. See The Chairman-Rapporteur, Report of the Chairman-Rapporteur: The Social Forum, para. 
50, delivered to the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/18 (Aug. 9, 2002) 
(explaining that the purpose of the U.N. Social Forum was to address the need “to give special voice to 
new actors, including the poor and the marginalized and their organizations, which have no space 
within the United Nations system”); Kaushik Basu, On the Goals of Development, in Frontiers of 
Development Economics: The Future on Perspective 61, 65 (Gerald M. Meier & Joseph E. 
Stiglitz eds., 2001) (stating that “in evaluating an economy’s state or progress, we must focus primarily 
on how the poorest people are faring”). 
 213. These arguments are set forth in a chapter entitled “Poverty as Capability Deprivation.” Sen, 
Development as Freedom, supra note 205, at 87-110.  
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health care, and gender equality. The essence of his argument is that 
alleviating impoverishment is instrumental rather than intrinsic.214  
 Sen then takes the capabilities approach further, arguing that poverty 
differs from traditional group-based need in two ways. First, the effects of 
poverty must be appraised and counteracted individually. Second, a greater 
allocation of resources is needed for indigent people to reach an optimal 
functional level than for other individuals. 215  While Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach adheres to established norms of functionality, Sen’s 
original capabilities approach does not require a threshold to guide or 
justify allocations to individuals with different needs. Rather, normative 
expectations about the most effective application of resources should not 
constrain the allocation of those resources to the poor. This latter assertion 
is consistent with the broad social reconstruction Nussbaum is attempting 
but does not achieve because of a flaw in the scope of her capabilities 
framework.216 
 Approaching poverty as a category for human rights protection would 
signify a dramatic shift in which individuals are formally endowed with 
identity-based rights. Established hard law treaties target particular groups 
in an effort to ameliorate human rights violations experienced by 
individuals within those categories. Extending human rights protections to 
the poor is in contrast to this established trend by emphasizing the value of 
individual identity over that of a group-based characteristic. In protecting 
individuals regardless of historically targeted group status, this focus 
removes the necessity of determining who is morally worthy of receiving 
this benefit, itself a prudentially difficult and possibly unjustifiable 
distinction. Such a shift also recognizes that opportunity involves a 
spectrum rather than a bright line of abilities. 
 Refocusing human rights empowerment and resource redistribution 
on the needs of particular individuals also helps accomplish three positive 
goals. First, it eliminates prejudice in a different manner than is currently 
perceived possible. This is because group identity norms by definition 
equate with negative stereotypes; otherwise, there would not be a need to 
eliminate civil or human rights violations. Raising individual identity and 
need over group identity and need can therefore circumvent the 
                                                                                                                          
 214. Id. At this point, one could plausibly argue that it is not any inherent limitation of disability, 
female gender, or particular ethnicity that creates capability deprivation, but rather the correlation of 
these characteristics with the means of accessing goods and services.  
 215. Id. 
 216. John Foster-Bey, Bridging Communities: Making the Link Between Regional Economies and 
Local Community Development, 8 Stan. L. & Pol’y R. 25, 27 (1997) (outlines the culture of poverty 
thesis by stating: “[P]overty is not merely a function of lack of income, but also results from social 
disorganization and unproductive behavioral traits that imbue low-income people with a sense of 
inferiority, conditioning them to accept their status as unavoidable. These beliefs create a set of psycho-
social barriers—a culture of poverty—that perpetuate poverty from generation to generation.”). 
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reinstantiation of negative stereotypes.217 Second, it focuses on individual, 
rather than group-based need, and thus can encourage the development of 
individual capacity. This dynamic is in sync with the human rights 
emphasis on protecting individual dignity and the capabilities approach’s 
emphasis on each person valued as an end. Moreover, as an empirical 
matter, overlap is likely to exist between the categories,218 including the 
tremendous prevalence of poverty among people with disabilities, 219 
women, and ethnic minorities.220 Third, it requires that human rights be 
integrated rather than fractured.221 This is evidenced by its concentration on 
individual need, which in turn reaches out to group-based need. For 
example, note the absence of the word “disability” from each of the 
respective United Nations Millennium projects relating to poverty, health, 
and HIV status, though each is factually linked to disability. 222 
Recalibrating the aim of the human rights discourse as a response to 
individual need would develop the capacity of all individuals on the basis 
of their inherent worth and potential. As such, disability-based rights 
                                                                                                                          
 217. This point is made in the disability context by Anita Silvers, Double Consciousness, Triple 
Difference: Disability, Race, Gender and the Politics of Recognition, in Disability, Divers-ability 
and Legal Change, supra note 78, at 75. 
 218. For a discussion of the interface between disability and gender at the international level, see 
Theresia M. Degener, Disabled Women and International Human Rights, in 3 Women and 
International Human Rights Law 267 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorian M. Koenig eds., 2001). For a 
broader discussion of the implications of double discrimination in this context, see the contributions in 
Gendering Disability (Bonnie G. Smith & Beth Hutchison eds., 2004); Women and 
Disabilities: The Double Handicap (Mary Jo Deegan & Nancy A. Brooks eds., 1985).  
 219. According to the World Bank, one-fifth of the poorest individuals have a disability. See Ann 
Elwan, Poverty and Disability: A Survey of the Literature (The World Bank Social 
Protection Paper No. 9932, 1999). See also tenBroek & Matson, supra note 141, at 809 (claiming that 
“poverty and disability are historically so intermeshed as to be often indistinguishable”). See also 
James D. Wolfensohn, Poor, Disabled and Shut Out, Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 2002, at A25 (statement by 
president of the World Bank that “research shows that disabled people are also more likely than other 
people to live in grinding poverty”).  
 220. Women, for example, constitute some 60% of the working poor, as reported by the U.N. Int’l 
Research & Training Inst. for the Advancement of Women, Women and Poverty: New Challenges, 
available at http://www.un-instraw.org/en/images/stories/Beijing/womenandpoverty.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2006). Using health and education data as alternative indicators of women’s poverty levels also 
clearly indicates women’s disadvantage relative to men in places such as South Asia, where “women 
have only about half as many years of education as men and female enrollment rates at the secondary 
level are only two-thirds the male rates.” World Development Report 2000/2001, Attacking 
Poverty: Opportunity, Empowerment, and Security 4, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTPOVERTY/Resources/WDR/overview.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2006). 
 221. This point is demonstrated by the absence of disability as in the essays comprising Dying 
for Growth: Global Inequality and the Health of the Poor (Jim Yong Kim et al. eds., 2000). 
 222. See sources and citations, supra note 107. By contrast, Christopher McCrudden correctly 
argues that one of the most effective, albeit perplexing, methods for effectuating human rights is to 
mainstream them into all levels of government decision making. Christopher McCrudden, 
Mainstreaming Human Rights, in Human Rights in the Community: Rights as Agents for 
Change 9 (Colin Harvey ed., 2005).  
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function as a capabilities-based bridge between established norms and 
future aspirations attending to individual need and talent development. 
Conclusion 
 This Article examines the theoretical implications of adding disability 
protections to the existing canon of human rights, both for individuals with 
disabilities and for other under-protected groups. It combines the best 
elements of the social model of disability, the human right to development, 
and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to proffer a disability human rights 
paradigm that provides a comprehensive framework for ensuring the 
development of individual talent. This Article maintains that Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach provides an especially fertile space within which to 
understand the content of human rights. Nonetheless, Nussbaum’s scheme 
falls short as a comprehensive framework because it excludes some 
individuals with intellectual disabilities and does not fully include others. 
Amending her approach to develop the talents of all individuals—even 
those Nussbaum considers not “truly human”—creates a disability human 
rights paradigm that comprehensively recognizes the dignity and worth of 
every individual.  
 Because disability rights invoke civil and political rights as well as 
economic, social, and cultural rights, the disability rights framework 
presents a strong reaffirmation that established human rights protections 
are similarly indivisible. Both types of rights are essential if hard laws are 
to be effective. Hence, groups whose rights have historically been divided 
between generational rights—such as women—could be strengthened by 
the disability rights paradigm. Applying a disability framework 
retrospectively to women reaffirms the need for a holistic approach to 
human rights that can prohibit discrimination and rework social 
landscapes. Moreover, utilizing a disability-based perspective could also 
extend human rights to currently unprotected people, including sexual 
minorities and the poor. Extending a disability human rights paradigm to 
these groups empowers vulnerable populations in very different ways. 
Sexual minorities have been excluded from social opportunities due to 
prejudicial social convention. Their protection thus follows an established 
and linear progression. The poor, however, do not possess immutable 
group-based identity characteristics. Poverty alleviation as a human right is 
a response to individual need and so raises a different set of human rights 
issues. Each of these possibilities—retrospective and prospective 
application of the disability rights paradigm to other groups—requires us to 
reexamine the bases underlying existing notions of human rights 
protection.  
 Finally, the assertions in this Article are unique. Instead of only 
advocating disability-specific protection paralleling established human 
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rights instruments, the Article also proffers an initial argument for 
extending disability-based human rights concepts to other groups. In doing 
so, this Article advocates for a dramatic shift in perspective by centering 
disability within the analytical framework. Considering the ability of 
disability-based notions to enrich the rights of already protected groups 
rather than analyzing the ability of traditionally accepted norms to be 
applied to the disabled is a dramatic change in rights discourse.  
 Historically, persons with disabilities have been among the most 
politically marginalized, economically impoverished, and least visible 
members of society. Many societies have viewed and continue to view this 
social exclusion as natural, or even a warranted consequence of the 
inherent inabilities of disabled persons. Adopting a disability human rights 
model—and then extending it to other groups—repositions disability as a 
universal and inclusive concept. As human beings, each of us has 
strengths, weaknesses, abilities, and limitations. A disability human rights 
framework prioritizes potential over function, and recognizes the value of 
every individual for his or her own end. It assesses the efficacy of human 
rights protection in light of exogenous factors that impact each person’s 
development. Doing so embraces disability as a universal human variation, 
rather than as an aberration.  
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